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ROBERT M. HUTCHINS
A Message to the Young Generation

T. S. ELIOT *The Aims of Education* Part 4

FRANZ SCHNABEL
Bismarck and the End of Classical Diplomacy

CARL BURCKHARDT
On Reading Churchill's "Memoirs"

AUSTIN WARREN *Religion as Self-Therapy*

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Watercolor by Paul Nash—A Poem

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The Edinburgh Festivals and a Scottish Theater

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A MESSAGE TO THE YOUNG GENERATION

Robert M. Hutchins

ONE OF THE SADDEST ASPECTS of my life is that I have not organized it so that I could know the students better. It would be outrageous presumption on my part to suppose that my presence here has anything to do with yours or that my departure can make the slightest difference to you. I cannot even claim that I have been what Mr. Justice Holmes said the common law was not, a brooding omnipresence in the sky. I have had no chance to brood, I cannot by any extension of the word have been said to be omnipresent, unless it means to be everywhere else, and I have spent more time in Wall Street than in the sky.

Yet, though seldom nourished by the sight of you, and sometimes not even by the thought of you, I have perhaps some right to say farewell to you, because you have been the inspiration of my life and have given to it such meaning as it has had. Here I do not refer to you as individuals sitting here tonight, but to the hundreds of thousands of young people who have passed through these halls while I have presided over the University and who have symbolized for me the rising generation and the hopes of mankind. If it had not been for you, and what you stood for, I should never have had the impulse to carry on my modest and intermittent efforts in higher education.

I must confess that this process of abstraction whereby some thousands of different individuals, each with his individual constitution, background, and desires, become equivalent to the rising generation and are treated as such, however valuable it is for the person making the abstraction, may not be so agreeable to the individuals abstracted. We have been struggling to create here a model

university. A model university is not one that asks, "What is good for these individual students?" but "What is good for all students?"; for a model is useless unless it can be imitated. Some aspects of this are not as serious as might at first appear. It is more than a verbal twist to say that a model university will do its best to see to it that each individual student has the greatest opportunities and the chance to make the most of them. But other aspects of the effort to create a model university are as serious for the students as they seem to be. If a model university is needed, it must be because the educational system and the public attitude toward it need in some degree to be changed. The students in such a university come out of the educational system and the public attitudes that exist. The student in the Chicago College comes from the American high school and may go into an American graduate or professional school. The University of Chicago is trying to change the American high school and the American graduate and professional school. So far it has been wholly successful only in changing its own. The result is that Chicago students may encounter difficulties that those of other institutions seldom hear of.

A model university in America at this time is necessarily at war with the public, for the public has little or no idea what a university is or what it is for. I do not need to tell you what the public thinks about universities. You know as well as I, and you know as well as I that the public is wrong. The fact that popular misconceptions of the nature and purpose of universities originate in the fantastic misconduct of the universities themselves is not consoling. It shows that a model university is needed; it shows how much one is needed; but it also suggests the tremendous difficulty of the enterprise upon which a model university embarks and the strength of the tide against which its students have to contend. It is clear to me that you are very superior and that you come from very superior families. Otherwise you could not have come to or stayed in so independent an institution. Some of you and some of your predecessors have tried to divert the University from its course and make it more like other universities. This I attribute to the contagion of the reforming spirit of the University itself and not to any desire on your part for an easier life. All students should want to reform their university. If the University is already unconventional, the only way to reform it is to make it conventional.

Your views on other matters through the years I have fully shared. I wish it were possible to eliminate the mechanics of institutional

life. In a large institution, for some reason, the rooms can never be nice enough, the food can never be good enough, the lights can never be bright enough, the buildings are either too hot or too cold, the processes of registration, examination, and graduation are too protracted and too complicated. I have carefully studied the various expressions of student opinion on these subjects as they have appeared since 1929 and have agreed with them all. There must be something refractory about the material out of which a university is made, or perhaps my efforts have been too modest and too intermittent. At any rate I have concluded that there is something about institutional life, at least on a large scale, that makes it impossible to do anything about it, just as I have concluded that the food in the various faculty clubs is identical, even though the clubs are as far apart as New York and Palo Alto, and that nothing can ever be done about it. One of the reasons why I would favor the development here of the Oxford and Cambridge system of small residential colleges that are federalized into a university is that I believe the smaller the unit the less institutional the institution.

Perhaps the greatest difference between your time in college and my own is the popularization in the intervening years of the works of Freud. Far be it from me to decry the significance of this writer. But I must say that he has had, as it seems to me, an unfortunate effect upon your conversation and upon the standards by which you judge yourselves and others. A graduate student in psychology told me last year that in her opinion 99 per cent of the people of this country were abnormal. In addition to providing an interesting definition of normality, this suggested to me that the ordinary difficulties of growing up and becoming human, from which the race has suffered for a million years, had taken on a kind of clinical character that I could not help hoping was exaggerated. Whenever I have visited with student groups, I have been impressed by your determined insistence that you were neurotic and your resentment at my suggestion that you looked perfectly all right to me.

On the principle laid down by Gilbert and Sullivan that when everybody is somebody, nobody is anybody: if everybody is abnormal, we don't need to worry about anybody. Nor should I be prepared to admit that a serious interest in being educated, the characteristic that distinguishes the students of the University of Chicago from all others, is necessarily neurotic. It may be in these times in this country somewhat eccentric, but it seems to me an

amiable eccentricity, and one that should be encouraged. The whole doctrine that we must adjust ourselves to our environment, which I take to be the prevailing doctrine of American education, seems to me radically erroneous. Our mission here on earth is to change our environment, not to adjust ourselves to it. If we become maladjusted in the process, so much the worse for the environment. If we have to choose between Sancho Panza and Don Quixote, let us by all means choose Don Quixote. The flat conformity of American life and thought, toward which all pressures in this country converge, raises the only doubt one may have about democracy, which is whether it is possible to combine the rule of the majority with that independence of character, conduct, and thought which the progress of any society requires.

One of the most interesting questions about the higher learning in America is this: why is it that the boy who on June 15 receives his degree, eager, enthusiastic, outspoken, idealistic, reflective, and independent, is on the following September 15, or even on June 16, except at Chicago, dull, uninspired, shifty, cautious, pliable, and attired in a double-breasted blue serge suit? Why are the graduates of the great American universities indistinguishable, even by their grammar, from the mass of the population who have never had their advantages? Their grammar may perhaps be accounted for by the deficiencies of the American schools, the ineradicable marks of which are borne by our fellow countrymen to their dying day. But what about the intellectual interest, the willingness and ability to reason, the independence of thought and character, the

> Spirit of youth, alive, unchanging,
> Under whose feet the years are cast,
> Heir to an ageless empire ranging
> Over the future and the past—

What about that? Why are the alumni organizations of the country, except that of Chicago, dedicated to the affectionate perpetuation of all the wrong things about their universities? Why do the massed graduates of American universities behave in the same way on the same kind of occasions as the massed followers of the most celebrated cultural institution of my native city, the Dodgers?

The answer must lie in the relative weakness of higher education compared with the forces that make everybody think and act like everybody else. Those forces beat upon the individual from his birth up on almost a twenty–four–hour–a–day basis and constitute

the greatest obstacle with which the schools have to contend; so that it can now be seriously argued that since education cannot cope with the comic book it should absorb it and substitute elevating and instructive comic books for textbooks. The horrid prospect that television opens before us, with nobody speaking and nobody reading, suggests that a bleak and torpid epoch may lie ahead, which, if it lasts long enough, will gradually, according to the principles of evolution, produce a population indistinguishable from the lower forms of plant life. Astronomers of the University of Chicago have detected something that looks like moss growing on Mars. I am convinced that Mars was once inhabited by rational beings like ourselves, who had the misfortune, some thousands of years ago, to invent television.

The forces that beat upon the American citizen from infancy become really serious when he finishes his formal schooling and has to think about earning a living and getting along in the world. How will those who have jobs to offer and prestige to confer feel about him if he does not merge imperceptibly with the scenery? How far will he get if he does not adjust himself to his environment? I hasten to say that I am for tact, politeness, and good manners. I would not for the world be taken as urging you to be offensive or holier–than–thou or carry a chip on your shoulder or fail to distinguish between matters of etiquette and matters of principle. You may even wear a double–breasted blue serge suit if you find it becoming. But to adjust yourselves to brutality, inhumanity, injustice, and stupidity, of which the world is full, though it is easy, and may look profitable, is, I must warn you, habit–forming, and will make out of you at the last characters that you would shudder to think of now.

My observation leads me to think that happiness lies in the fullest use of one's highest powers. Of course it is folly to talk of the fullest use of a man's highest powers if he is starving to death. You are in little danger of starving to death, at least you are if a world catastrophe can be avoided. Your advantages are such that you have a decided superiority over the great majority of your fellow citizens when it comes to the sheer business of staying alive. Your problem lies in the moral and intellectual realm, in achieving the feeling that you have made the most of yourselves, that you have done the best you could, and that you have not let down yourselves or your fellow men.

Here I hope that you will follow the example of your university. I still think, as I have thought for many years, that the motto of the University should be that line from Walt Whitman, "Solitary, singing in the West, I strike up for a new world."

Our lives are overshadowed now by the threat of impending doom. If you were neurotic, I could not blame you. To what extent the threat of impending doom grows out of our ignorance and immorality, and to what extent it grows out of the ignorance and immorality of the Russians I do not pretend to know. I confess, too, that I have a lifelong hatred of war that perhaps makes it impossible for me to have a rational view of the present situation. War has always seemed to me the ultimate wickedness, the ultimate stupidity. And if this was true in less enlightened times, when the best we could do was to slaughter one another with TNT, it is plain as day now, when, thanks to the progress of the higher learning, we can wipe out thousands of innocent people at one blow, and be wiped out ourselves in the same way. I am not a pacifist. I would echo the sentiments of Patrick Henry. I grant that when a great power is loose in the world seeking whom it may destroy, it is necessary to prepare to defend our country against it.

Yet the goal toward which all history tends is peace, not peace through the medium of war, not peace through a process of universal intimidation, not peace through a program of mutual impoverishment, not peace by any means that leaves the world too frightened or too weak to go on fighting, but peace pure and simple, based on that will to peace which has animated the overwhelming majority of mankind through countless ages. This will to peace does not arise out of a cowardly desire to preserve one's life and property, but out of a conviction that the fullest development of the highest powers of men can be achieved only in a world at peace.

War, particularly modern war, is a horrible disaster. If this is the destiny prepared for us, we must meet it as best we can. But at least we should have no illusions about it. There is a certain terrifying lightheartedness underlying the talk about war today. Each political party is belaboring the other not because it is too warlike, but because it is too peaceful. Men in public life are being crucified because they are suspected of trying to keep the peace. The presidents of the greatest universities have met and enthusiastically voted to abandon the higher learning so that the universities may become part of the military establishment. By endless reiteration of the

slogan, "America must be strong," we have been able to put a stop to our mental processes altogether and to forget what strength is.

We appear to believe that strength consists of masses of men and machines. I do not deny that they have their role. But surely the essential ingredients of strength are trained intelligence, love of country, the understanding of its ideals, and, above all, a conviction of the justice of our cause. Since men of good will can regard war as conceivable only as a last resort, they must be convinced that all channels of negotiation have been kept open till the last moment and that their own government has sought in good faith, and without consideration of face or prestige, to prevent the outbreak of war. Men of good will must be convinced that they are not fighting to maintain colonialism, feudalism, or any other form of entrenched injustice. And since it is obvious to the merest simpleton that war must come sooner or later to a world of anarchy, men of good will would hope that their own government would proclaim its desire to transform the United Nations from a loose association of independent states into an organization that could adopt and enforce world law.

There seems to be something about contemporary civilization that produces a sense of aimlessness. Why do university presidents cheerfully welcome the chance to devote their institutions to military preparations? They are of course patriotic; but in addition I think they feel that education is a boring, confusing, difficult matter that nobody cares very much about anyway, whereas getting ready for war is simple, clear, definite, and respectable. Can it be that modern men can have a sense of purpose only if they believe that other men are getting ready to kill them? If this is true, western civilization is surely neurotic, and fatally so.

You are getting an education infinitely better than that which my generation, the generation that now rules the world, had open to it. You have had the chance to discern the purpose of human life and human society. Your predecessors in this place, now scattered all over the world, give us some warrant for hoping that as you go out to join them you will bear with you the same spark that they have carried, which, if carefully tended, may yet become the light that shall illumine the world. I shall always be proud and happy that we were here together.

NOTE: This is the text of Mr. Hutchins' farewell address to the students, delivered on February 2, 1951, upon his resignation as Chancellor of the University of Chicago.

THE AIMS OF EDUCATION

4. THE ISSUE OF RELIGION

T. S. Eliot

We have, so far, arrived (I hope) at the conclusion that there is a reciprocal implication between education for citizenship, or as a social being, and the development of the latent powers of the individual, or the improvement of "man as man." A man cannot be altogether a good citizen unless he is also a good man; and the wholly good man must also be a good citizen—at least in the sense that he is one who cares for the good of his neighbors. The distinction, and the relationship, are similar to that between work and play. There is something wrong when a man gets no enjoyment from his work; and to play any game properly you have to work at it.

Even, however, if we recognize the mutual implication of citizenship and individual development, we still lack a standard by which to measure one or the other. We therefore incline to take either as the standard for the other in different contexts. In one context, citizenship is undefined; we take for granted that whatever it means, we all understand it; and our notion of individual development will be adapted to the undefined citizenship. In another context, we may do exactly the reverse. The limitation to one point of view will tend to make us either authoritarians, placing strict limitations upon the exercise of individual choice or caprice; the limitation to the other point of view will make us libertarians, holding, as some people have, that the best government is that which governs the least. The latter will tend to believe that human beings are naturally good, and that left to themselves they will flower into good citizens; the former that you can make them good by enforcing good laws—or else, that the residue of a human being's behavior, beyond what can be controlled by legislation, does not matter. And in this contest it is

likely to be the authoritarians who will win, because authority is a short cut to dealing with abuses and injustices; and the contexts in which we are members of a mass are more compulsive than those in which we are individuals. In the latter, we stand alone; and it is easier to submit to an authority with which we identify ourselves than to tolerate nonconformity in others.

Although we may at this point agree that citizenship and individual development imply each other, we lack an outside standard by which citizenship and individual development can both be measured; for the measurement by each other leaves us in a vicious circle of illusory definition, defining each in turn in terms of the other. We have found that "the improvement of man as man" is an empty phrase, unless we can agree about what is improvement; and that we cannot agree about this unless we find a common answer to the question "What is Man?" Now we cannot expect to agree to one answer to this question; for with this question, our differences will turn out in the end to be religious differences; and it does not matter whether you are a "religious person" or not, or whether you expressly repudiate everything that you call "a religion"; there will be some sort of religious attitude—even if you call it a nonreligious attitude—implied in your answer.

There are two questions which have to be distinguished: that of the place of religion in education, and that of the place of education in religion. The first is the question with which we are more familiar. To the question of the place of religion in education, there are several answers. The most important seem to be the following :

1. Where the State itself professes allegiance to a particular religion, or religious denomination, this religion may be affirmed, and taught, in all the educational institutions controlled by the State; and the teaching will be in conformity with the doctrines of this religion. Private institutions, for those who profess another religion or branch of the same religion, and for those who object to all religious teaching, may under such a system be either tolerated or suppressed: but as the suppression of every form of religious teaching except that of the official religion of the State seems to me unchristian, I am not concerned with this extreme. (All educational foundations might be religious, and none specially favored by the State. As this would be an accidental situation, implying that the State itself should take no responsibility for education, it is a purely hypothetical situation which need not concern us.)

2. The complete separation of religious instruction from instruction in other subjects. This means that in schools and colleges no

religious beliefs would be taken for granted or inculcated. Religious instruction would be reserved for the home, the Sunday school, and of course the theological training college.

3. The imparting in schools of such religious instruction as represents the common belief of the greatest part of the local society, leaving the doctrines of any particular denomination to be taught by the parents and their church. This is more or less the intention of the British Education Act of 1944: it is, of course, qualified by concessions to those parents who wish their children excused from this religious instruction, either on the ground of wanting more specific doctrine or that of another religion, or of objecting to religious teaching of any kind.

4. A mixed system, in which no religion is taught in the State schools, but in which the adherents of any religion may set up denominational schools for their own children.

These are, I believe, the chief ways of dealing with the problem of religion in education. They are all, unfortunately, unsatisfactory.

We may group together the first and the second of these systems as being based on a principle, and the third and fourth as based on expediency. In drawing this distinction I am not making any value judgment: an inconsistent method may work better than a consistent one. I am merely saying that the expedient systems are not logically defensible. If the denominational school embodies the correct theory of the relation of religion to education, then it is deplorable that the greater part of the population should be deprived of its advantages; if the secular school embodies the correct theory, then it is questionable whether the denominational school should not be, to put it mildly, discouraged. (Of course, in practice, they are not so different as all that: education in secular schools does not necessarily quench religious faith in its products, and the pupils who have been educated in denominational schools frequently disencumber themselves of such religious education as they have received, very soon after they go out into the world.) Not only cannot both systems be right; the denominations cannot all be right either. Nor can the supporter of the schools of his church be altogether satisfied with his privileges. For he must be aware that his schools are tolerated by outsiders because they represent too small a minority to be worth suppressing, or because they represent too powerful a minority to suppress. He must be aware also that the costs of equipping a modern university are so great that his own church cannot supply itself with enough to go round, and that great numbers of young people will proceed from their church schools into a very different atmosphere: in England,

certainly, there is no great university in which the religious foundation is now anything but vestigial.

The introduction into state-provided schools of such religious instruction as can be agreed upon as representing the common beliefs of the largest Christian sects is an experiment of the British Education Act of 1944. This is a compromise between teaching the tenets of one particular denomination, and leaving religious education altogether to parents and Sunday schools. What its effect may be remains to be seen. Behind it, however, there is a remarkable theory of which its promotors were no doubt unaware. It is implicitly an assertion that "Christianity" is simply what all Christians believe in common, and that this is what is essential; that the differences are unimportant; and that it is possible to be a satisfactory Christian without belonging to any church. In this way the State may be initiating a theological doctrine of its own, in contradiction to all the churches. Children are to be taught in schools all that is necessary to be a Christian; leaving to the parents the option of teaching them what is necessary to be Episcopalian, Methodist, Presbyterian, Congregationalist or Baptist—just as they may have private lessons in piano or violin. That is the theory. The *tendency* would be, if it went to the whole length of that unlikely course, for the several churches to be supplanted by a new State Christianity. For the implication of teaching only a part of Christianity is that that is the only part which matters.

So much for the third and fourth methods. I have said that the first and second are defensible in principle. The first, that in which all State schools will teach the tenets of a particular religion and communion, is possible only under one of two conditions. Either the nation must be homogeneous in religion, so that the official religion of the State is that of the vast majority of individual citizens, or else a dictatorial government must impose its own doctrines on the mass of society—or at least impose a conformity of outward profession—by discipline, inoculation, or fraud. For such despotism there is nothing to be said. The former is possible only in a few countries, and even in these it presents dangers so grave that it may become as unsatisfactory as any other. It may lead to the control of the Church by the State, or to the control of the State by the Church: two situations between which there may not be much to choose. But it has one striking advantage in theory at least. From my point of view, it does not matter in this particular context whether the Church established in education is a national Church with a national head, or an international Church with an international head. If a National Church, then it should have a hierarchy independent of the State, and prepared if necessary

to oppose the State; but where the hierarchy is itself composed of clerics appointed by the State, we have to rely on the State not to appoint men who will be subservient to it. In either case, an authoritative and independent church is desirable for meeting the difficulty which I raised earlier in connection with the third of our "aims of education." I said that the second aim, "training for citizenship," was directed by the meaning of citizenship represented by an outside authority, in relation to which the individual has defined rights, responsibilities, and duties of submission; and that the third aim, "develop latent powers," or "improve man as man," was left to every individual, or at least to every educator, to interpret as he pleases. It is the province of our religious teachers to instruct us in our latent powers and tell us which are good and which are bad, and to give a definite meaning to the improvement of "man as man." We need a Church capable of conflict with the State as well as of co-operation with it. We need a Church to protect us from the State, and to define the limits of our rights, responsibilities, and duties of submission in relation to our rights, and to our responsibilities and duties to ourselves and towards God. And, owing to human fallibility, we may sometimes need the State to protect us against the Church. Too close identification of the two can lead to oppression from which there is no escape.

The system in which instruction in schools and colleges is purely secular, leaving religious instruction to parents and voluntary Sunday schools, appears at first to be the antithesis of that which I have just been discussing. It achieves consistency by attempting to leave out the third aim of education, or at least by limiting the meaning of "latent powers" to "capacities for everything except spiritual life," and the meaning of "the improvement of man as man" to "the improvement of man as the highest of the apes, or as *homo faber et ludens*"—but not as a son of God. But the assertion that a man's religion is his private affair, that from the point of view of society it is irrelevant, may turn out in the end to lead to a situation very favorable to the establishment of a religion, or a substitute for religion, by the State. The religious sense, and the sense of community, cannot be finally divorced from each other. They are first formed, certainly, in the family; and when they are defective in the family, the defect cannot be supplied by the school and the university. But on the other hand, the contrast between a community life in which religion has no place, and a family life for which it is reserved, cannot be long endured; and the weakening of the social side of religion in the outside world will tend to weaken it in the family also; and the

weakening of the religious bond between members of the same household, beginning at that early age at which we first think that we are thinking for ourselves, will leave the family reduced to the insecure bond of affection and sentiment. Thus, when religion comes to be more and more an individual matter, and is no longer a family tie; when it becomes a matter of voluntary association on one day a week when the weather is neither too good nor too bad, and of a traditional and more and more meaningless verbiage in the pulpit and at times on the political platform; when it ceases to inform the whole of life; then a vacuum is discovered, and the belief in religion will be gradually supplied by a belief in the State. That part of the social life which is independent of the State will be diminished to the more trivial. The necessity will appear for a common belief in *something* to fill the place of religion in the community; and the liberals will find themselves surrendering more and more of the individual freedom which was the basis of their doctrine.

Let me return for a moment to the terms in which I put the first of my alternatives; that is,

> where the State itself professes allegiance to a particular religion or religious denomination, this religion may be assumed, and taught, in all the educational institutions controlled by the State; and the teaching will be in conformity with the doctrines of this religion.

Now there are obvious practical difficulties here, the first of which is that such a system is patently out of the question in any actual English-speaking country. We have a bias in favor of freedom: and we are not racially or religiously sufficiently homogeneous. But where such homogeneity is found, there are incidental dangers to the spiritual life of a people upon which I shall not dilate. The more general dangers are three: that the State shall control the Church, or fashion its own Church; that the Church shall control the State; or that the citizen shall think of himself as owing allegiance, on the same plane, to two States. For the term "religion" is just as slippery as "education," or "democracy," or a host of other terms: we tend to mean one thing in one context and another in another, and to think that because we use the same word we are indicating the same thing. When we talk of Church and State we are contrasting two institutions, and the Church is something more, and something different from a secular institution. We are ignoring the religious aspect of the Church; and religion, just because it comprehends everything, cannot be compared with anything.

There is another complication which I must introduce at this

point. You may remember that I started by criticizing the three aims of education which I took over, as a point of departure, from Dr. C. E. M. Joad. I suggested that whereas "education for citizenship" might come to mean something too precise and restricted to the standards of the moment, education for "the development of latent powers" was dangerously vague; and that it was for another authority than the State to instruct us in the cultivation and discipline of moral, intellectual, and spiritual powers with which the State was not concerned. An excessive interference and control by the State, in the answer to the question "What is a good citizen?," and a State regulation of the discipline calculated to produce good citizens, would produce only *conformity*. An excessive interference and control by a Church, in the answer to the question "What is a good man?," might also produce mere conformity. For there are many aspects of the good life, both for the individual and for society, with which the Church is not directly concerned. The direct question to which the church of any religion must provide an answer is "What is necessary for salvation?" Several churches, at various times and places, have been so sure that nothing was necessary *but* salvation, that a good deal of harm has come of it: for instance, the destruction of the Library of Alexandria by the Moslem invaders, the spoliation of shrines and casting down of images in the Protestant Reformation, and the use of torture and appalling forms of death as a deterrent to heresy. On the other hand, in past ages the churches of all countries have been the centers for the arts; the religions of Europe and Asia have provided the motive for the greatest works of art of these continents; and the civilizations of Europe and Asia would be inconceivable without their religious basis. Yet civilization, and the development of higher forms of culture, can only be considered, from the religious point of view, as by-products. The fact that we do not get them except through belief in a religion does not imply that any church, or any minister of religion, is necessarily competent to pronounce in all questions of art—as inspection of some modern religious edifices will attest.

It should by now be apparent why I suggested beforehand, in turning to the question of the place of religion in education, that all of the possibilities I listed were unsatisfactory. It is at least clear that in a society in which the population is not of only one religion, or, within one religion, is divided into sects—and this is the kind of society for which we have to legislate in English-speaking countries—one or another compromise must be practiced, and each society or community must find out for itself which kind of compromise is least unsatisfactory for its own region. So that in such countries any theory

of education which the framer designs to be realizable must stop short at the point beyond which religious differences cannot be ignored. Unless we can get complete agreement about religious truth—that is, the ultimate truth about Man—we must not expect to be able to agree upon an ideal system of education which can be put into practice. Many situations in life have to be dealt with by compromise, and we must not repine over this misfortune of the human condition. But I think that it is very important, when we are forced by circumstances to stop short of the proper terminus of our speculations, to be aware of what we are doing; in respect to the present subject matter, not to pretend that a theory of education can be complete which excludes the ultimate religious problems—and I have said that "What is Man?" is one of these—and which attempts to delimit for the theory of education an area within which religion can be ignored.

I am now, I hope, in a position to remark that the inquiry into "the place of religious teaching in education" with which I have been occupying myself for some minutes is really unimportant for the purposes which I set myself in these discourses. Only, it is a problem which had to be inquired into first, before we can see how and why it is unimportant in this context. In my "aims of education" it is not the place of religion in education, but the place of education in religion, that is the vital issue. I began with stating three aims of education on which I hoped that we should all agree, and then attempted to show first that each of these aims was involved in the others, and that each both extended and qualified the meaning of the others. I tried to show, after this, that the pursuit of the meaning of these three aims leads us beyond the frontiers of the area which we should like to fence off as that of education, and forces us into the difficult territory of social and political philosophy, ethics, and finally metaphysics and theology. So that until we all come to agree in our theology, our agreement on educational questions can be only an agreement on what is possible and desirable for a particular society under the peculiar conditions of its place, time, and composition. And in our theoretical discussion of education we should try to make clear to ourselves and to others what philosophy is behind our opinions.

I do not want to leave you with the impression that I think we should postpone our discussions of education, or our attempts to improve present systems and correct their faults, until we have come to an agreement on ultimate problems. Nor do I presume that if we all came to hold the same philosophical and religious views we should suddenly all find ourselves in agreement as to how to run our schools

and universities. We should simply have got to a point at which the possibilities of confusion and misunderstanding and conflict would be minimized. There would remain many questions to which philosophy and theology could give no direct answer, or to which they would give a variety of possible answers; and there would still be a vast field for that disagreement, argument, and experiment which are necessary for activity and improvement.

Let me now, as I draw to a close, try to sum up the several conclusions to which I have come on the way. First, that "good citizenship" cannot be wholly limited to the definition of it provided by a government, or the doctrines of any particular political philosophy. Second, that the question "What is the development of latent powers of the individual?" or the question "How is man as man to be improved?" cannot be answered without reference to theology, although much is included in "improvement" which is not immediately in the province of theology. So, while we have found that we must consult our political philosophers for the elucidation they can give of our second aim of education, and that we must consult our theologians for help in elucidating the third, and our theologians who are also political philosophers for whatever they have to say on both questions together, we find that none of them covers the whole area to which each aim applies, and we are forced to reopen the question.

We have found that the two aims imply each other, just as both are implied in the first. We can say that we agree that every human being should, ideally, be educated to do the best of which he is capable by his neighbors and himself. He should, furthermore, be educated to be able to decide between conflicting claims: for we are, in practice, often faced with the necessity for sacrificing self-interest—not selfishness, but a high self-interest—to social claims, or of sacrificing social obligations to the needs of our own essential self. There are the claims represented by the State, and the claims represented by the Church; but there are, furthermore, the claims represented by our own being. If I feel ready to write a poem, and I therefore decline to address a meeting on behalf of some good cause, or prepare a paper for an important week-end conference, what is the outcome? If the poem turns out a good one, I feel justified; if it is a failure, I feel guilty. The success is always uncertain; and as for the failure, I am thinking of instances in which one could have been certain, in sacrificing the writing of the poem, of being engaged otherwise in doing something at least moderately useful. And if it is difficult to decide for ourselves, it is often impossible to judge for others. Was Thoreau a good citizen when he retired to Walden? Many a man has

pursued a course which seemed folly to his family, or which appeared antisocial, or which meant pain and sacrifice for others, and we denounce him or praise him afterwards according to results which could never have been predicted. So I think we must allow a place after all to individual choice in "the development of latent powers," although with all the qualifications with which we have now loaded the phrase.

There is, however, another lane up which I must chase a hare before coming to my conclusion. So far, our aims have been for the individual: to train him to become the best that he is capable of becoming. We have been concerned only with the present, not with the past or the future. Now I suggest that one aim of education should be concerned with another obligation besides that towards the persons to be taught. If we consider only the latter, our curriculum may vary with every wind of doctrine; our notions of what is a good way of earning a living, of what is good citizenship, and of what is good individual development, may be at the mercy of the prevailing mood of one generation, or the caprice of individual educators. It should be an aim of education to maintain the continuity of our culture—and neither continuity, nor a respect for the past, implies standing still. More than ever, we should look to education today to preserve us from the error of pure contemporaneity. We look to institutions of education to maintain a knowledge and understanding of the past. And the past has to be reinterpreted for each generation, for each generation brings its own prejudices and fresh misunderstandings. All this may be comprehended in the term history; but history includes the study of the great dead languages and of the past of modern languages, including our own. Particularly, indeed, our own; for we need to understand the way in which our words have been used in the past, how they have developed and altered their meanings, in order to understand how we are using them ourselves. And to preserve the wisdom of the past, we need to value it for its own sake, not simply to defend it on the ground of its usefulness. To support religion on the ground of its usefulness is obvious error; for the question, of what use is man to God, is more important than the question, of what use is God to man; and there is an analogy—though I admit the danger of drawing such an analogy with temporal affairs—in our relation to our culture. For if we estimate the wisdom and experience and art of the past only in terms of its usefulness to us, we are in danger of limiting the meaning of "usefulness," and of limiting the meaning of "us" to those who are now alive. What I wish to maintain is a point of view from which it appears more important—if we have

to choose, and perhaps we do have to choose—that a small number of people should be educated well, and others left with only a rudimentary education, than that everybody should receive a share of an inferior quality of education, whereby we delude ourselves into thinking that whatever there can be the most of, must be the best. And what I plead for is what Matthew Arnold spoke of as "the knowledge of the best that has been thought and said in the world" (and, I might add, the best that has been done in the world, and that has been created in the arts in the world); that this knowledge of history, in the widest sense, should not be reserved to a small body of experts—reserved to them and parceled out among them—but that it should be the common possession of those who have passed through the higher grades of nonspecialized education; that it might well form, for most of them, the foundation for many of the more modern studies which now tend to be substituted for it.

We may now, having taken account of the aims of education and pursued the definition as far as we could, proceed to inquire what is the use of the sort of conclusion we arrive at. We find that we have given no definition of education, that in fact education does not appear to be definable. The most that we can do is to list a number of the things that education might be expected to do, and try to show that each of these, if it is to be called education, must imply the rest. They are several of the purposes which education has been made to serve; we have been able to arrive at definitions, of a sort, of some of these purposes; and although we cannot define education *simpliciter,* our awareness of the mutual implication of its several purposes gives us a feeling of an identity of the word which is similar to the feeling I have professed to have of identity among the several uses of the word *runcible.* We must continue, however, to speak of "education" when we mean one of several possible uses of the word; and this felt identity is what makes it impossible for us to substitute, for the sake of clarity, several different words.

The final question is, "What is the use of such inquiries: that is, Does it make any difference to education in practice whether we speculate about the meaning of the word or not?" Men have been training their children ever since they were men, and indeed before it: I do not know at what precise point in the scale of living creatures the training of the young may be said to begin. The content of education and its form have varied according to the organization of the society in and for which the young have been trained; a long tradition and many educational institutions preceded the time at which the question "What is education?" needed to be asked. Or

rather, we ask the question about the purpose of an activity at some time after we have begun to practice it; and we have found that the question has to be asked again and again, because the activity itself alters from generation to generation. But the machinery of education, which has now become vast and complicated almost the world over, has to be kept going all the time. Many changes and developments are due to accidents, to response to local and immediate circumstances; some are due to the deliberate purpose of individual educators—right or wrong; some to the influence of a book, such as Rousseau's *Emile* (and Rousseau was a literary dabbler like myself); some to political theory or theological doctrine; some to wisdom, some to folly, and some to circumstances beyond our control. But when we set out to define education, what are we trying to do? We are not trying to compose a lexical definition—that is, the customary use of a word. We are attempting to isolate the common element in a great number of kinds of training, pursued for different ends, in very different civilizations. We are attempting, that is, to devise a master key for a number of different locks. But we are also attempting to find a stipulative definition: we are not merely trying to say what the word education means—that is, has meant to those people whom we consider qualified to use it—but what true education should be. We are aiming at a real rather than a nominal definition, and are in effect trying to persuade people to accept a definition of our own. But our motive for attempting a definition may spring from our objection to the practice of education which we have endured or observed, or to the theories of other people of what education is. Since I have insisted on the fact that behind every theory of education we find, implicit or explicit, philosophical and theological, as well as sociological premises, it might be thought the question is one only for philosophers, and not for those engaged in teaching and the administration of educational institutions. But the latter have a fund of experience, and, if they are wise men, a store of wisdom, about education, which only those who have actually made teaching their vocation can have. It seems to me that it is the task of educators to think and to write about education, but to clarify for themselves the social, philosophical, and theological presuppositions which underlie their generalizations; and it is for the pure theoretician, the philosopher or theologian, to refer his theories to the educator—the man who has had experience of the difficulties of teaching anybody anything. It is, incidentally, for the legislator, when he is moved by aught but political expediency, to consult both, as well as to do a little thinking for himself.

It is obvious that no lexical definition of education can answer the question "What is education?," since all that a dictionary can do is to tell us the principal ways in which the word has been used in the past, and up to the date at which the lexicographer compiled his account of the word, by those writers whose authority he respects. While we are aware of a relation among these several definitions of the uses of the word, we seem unable to get any one primary definition, which all these secondary definitions will imply. The definition we are seeking is one which involves judgments of value; it will therefore be one upon which we cannot all agree, so cannot possibly be a definition in the dictionary sense. (Incidentally, people have been very far from agreeing upon a definition of the word "definition.") As for the list of aims, whether it be of three or more, and whether we introduce subdivisions or not, there are several qualifications to be made. It is always possible that one or more of the purposes listed by a writer may be wrong, or wholly unacceptable to others; it is possible that what is in fact the same purpose may be expressed by different writers in quite different terms; and it is always possible that the list ought to be longer. We all try, of course, to reduce it to as few as possible: that is one of the rules of the game. But just as the meaning of the word education has developed in the past, and may be expected to develop and change further in the future, so it is possible that in some future and unpredictable situation the purposes of education will have to be formulated anew, and also that new purposes may appear which cannot be reduced to terms of those already recognized.

It may be observed, also, that the more clear and distinct we make our ideas on the subject, the less is the likelihood of agreement on what these aims or purposes are. The more definite your views, the fewer people will be found to accept them. Most people will accept the assertion that education involves some kind of moral training; fewer will accept the assertion that it involves religious training; and of those who accept the principle of religious training, fewer still will agree on how far it should go and how dogmatic it should be. We may agree that the educational question can be satisfactorily answered "when we get our metaphysics, ethics, psychology, theology and politics straight enough to think straight about it." But this is a date, I suspect, at the other end of infinity. The prospect of the sages of any one of these disciplines agreeing amongst themselves seems remote; the prospect of the practitioners of these several disciplines agreeing with each other, and upon the relative contributions of their sciences to the perfecting of education, seems remoter still.

We are all, in fact, trying to persuade other people; that is, we appeal to their emotions, and often indeed to their prejudices, as well as to their reason; and the best we can do is to see that *as well as* (to our reason) does not become *instead of* (to our reason). We can at least *try* to understand our own motives, passions, and prejudices, so as to be conscious of what we are doing when we appeal to those of others. This is very difficult, because our own prejudice and emotional bias always seem to us so rational. We are perpetually engaged in pointing out the extent to which other people's reasoning is deflected by their sentiments. I am quite aware that I have been trying to persuade, though I may not be quite sure of what. But although I should be discouraged if nobody agreed with anything I have said, I should be thoroughly alarmed if everybody agreed; because a statement upon which everyone can agree, in the discussion of topics such as these, is pretty certain not to mean much. I hope, however, that my main motive has been to unsettle your minds, rather than to impose a theory; and while I have gone on defining, I have not been thinking of convincing, though you may have been thinking of your next cocktail party.

BISMARCK AND THE END OF CLASSICAL DIPLOMACY

Franz Schnabel

From the French Revolution to the present, attempts have been made to establish and maintain order within the system of European states on the basis of two different and mutually conflicting principles that have alternated with each other. The first principle found expression in the traditional European system of a balance of power; after centuries of wars among the powers this system finally achieved, in the eighteenth century, an almost ideal state of equilibrium—primarily through the efforts of William III of Orange, that greatest of all statesmen of the balance of power, and through the Peace of Utrecht. This was subsequently ended by the French Revolution. The second principle is based on the tenet that the community of nationhood is more important and more valuable than the political relationships that may either unite different nations in one state or split up members of one nation into different states. What exactly is meant by the term "nationhood" has never been unequivocally determined. In trying to define it, the French Revolution responded at the same time to the strong political consciousness of a nation that had grown along with the state, and to the basic concept of *volonté* originating in the thought of its intellectual father, Rousseau; the Revolution made nationhood depend on the will that was paving the way for the *volonté* of the nineteenth century. A nation is what a nation wants to be! The French were guided by the notion that a nation is made up of individuals who have shared many experiences in the past and who are ready to accomplish a great deal together. German romanticism, on the other hand, followed Herder and his organic or biological concept of the life of nations. According to this school of thought, it is nature—the origin and community of "folkstems"

(the word was coined by Herder)—that determines a nation; its unique character develops with its growth and realizes itself in the *Volksgeist*. The French idea of nationhood is rooted in the conviction that man is endowed with free will, that he can decide to what nation he wants to belong, that he can assimilate himself or be naturalized. Man's will can be guided by education and propaganda, and must be ascertained by public manifestation, by elections and plebiscites. On that will of individuals, strengthened and tested by history, there rests the unity of the national state, of national institutions, of national culture and language. The German romantics, on the other hand, saw in "naturalization" a violation of nature; they looked for ethnical traits, putting particular emphasis on language—*soweit die deutsche Zunge klingt* (as far as the German tongue is spoken). And for the romantics, language itself—especially according to the interpretation of Jakob Grimm—was nothing accidental but rather the expression of man's innermost character. To them, one of the basic notions of humanism—that the mind by its own overwhelming power is able to enter into the spirit of another nation—appeared impossible; they claimed all men of German descent for the German state and wanted to exclude all others as aliens.

The French as well as the German romantic idea of nationhood spread all over Europe. Among the stateless peoples of Eastern Europe both views entered into the most diversified relationships with each other, and revolutionized Europe: nation-states replaced monarchial states, and the traditional political order of Europe eventually disintegrated in the process. Classical diplomacy—which practice and experience had developed since the Italian Renaissance into an art of high rank—had successfully maintained a European equilibrium by means of coalitions and treaties, and had restored this equilibrium whenever it was disrupted by wars. Against this classical diplomacy there arose—after Mirabeau, Lafayette, and Danton—the "patriots," the awakeners[1] of nations. But at the Congress of Vienna classical diplomacy once more achieved a great triumph: in the new order which it established in Europe according to the principle of equilibrium, the distribution of territories among the individual states was explicitly determined by the *quantité* and not by the *espèce* of populations. But once again in opposition to the old cabinet di-

[1] The German equivalent for "people's awakeners" (*Volkserwecker*) was widely used by the nationalist demagogues of the early nineteenth century. The term is of special interest since, as Professor Schnabel suggests, it points to a connection between the nationalist movement of the last century and the religious revivalist (*Erweckung*) movement of the eighteenth. Editor.

plomacy of princely councilors and lords chamberlain—"their cold breasts decorated by dim stars," as the poet Ludwig Uhland wrote—there arose the peoples, and those who claimed to have awakened them. In the course of one century they undid the work of the Vienna Congress, and the essence of nineteenth-century history must be seen in this process. The revolt of nations abolished the old monarchies and the system of European states, replacing them by self-contained national states. After 1815 "diplomats" and "patriots" stood against each other; Metternich, Talleyrand, Nesselrode, Felix Schwarzenberg—all of them defenders of the old system—battled the Hungarian, Polish, Czech, and Italian patriots: Szechenyi and Kossuth, Kosciusko, Palacky, Confalonieri, Mazzini, Garibaldi, Cavour. In Germany, only, the movement for the nation-state remained more or less anonymous and was tied to many different centers. But even there, before and after 1848, there was no lack of patriotic leaders —from Freiherr vom Stein, Arndt, and Jahn, to Dahlmann, Heinrich von Gagern, to Robert Blum, Gottfried Kinkel, Friedrich Hecker, to Heinrich von Treitschke—who, although a pupil of Dahlmann, was by origin and temperament much closer to the Czech nationalism of a Palacky. Like Palacky, Treitschke placed the isolated national state above the idea of the old Empire; he may be considered a bourgeois forerunner of the dictators of the twentieth century.

Indeed, the nationalists of all countries, whenever they considered national unity and expansion more important than human rights, were surprisingly alike. Their hatred of the diplomats—whose pen spoiled what the trusted sword had achieved or was destined to achieve—was checked only by the power which was still at the disposal of the diplomats as long as they were the executives of the old states. The history of this battle between the patriots and the diplomats has not yet been written; nor has there appeared a historian for that classical diplomacy which—comprising a great number of imposing and powerful minds from the Venetian ambassadors of the sixteenth century to Metternich and Talleyrand—must be considered as one of the great accomplishments of old Europe and deserving of our highest interest. Works that have claimed to be histories of classical diplomacy are really no more than histories of the foreign relations of individual states. In recent years, however, a distinguished English writer, Harold Nicolson, has explored the development and nature, the methods, results, and limits of diplomacy, in a fine work that ought to be read by everyone who is concerned with modern history and the problems of statecraft.[2]

[2] Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (London, T. Butterworth, Ltd., 1939).

The political and historical discussions of our own time lead us naturally to the question to what extent Bismarck belongs to classical diplomacy, and how much he has had in common with the national awakeners and leaders. For the historical judgment of him and his lifework, it is obviously important that this question be correctly formulated and correctly answered. Nobody will consider Bismarck akin to Arndt and Jahn; he thought in political rather than in "folk" terms, and his attitude was not that of a zealot. He never lost his composure in the course of negotiations, except when he deliberately wanted to intimidate. After his work had been accomplished he occasionally called the enthusiast Gottfried Kinkel a forerunner, but with that brilliant irony which is so characteristic of him he drew a line between his own "diplomat's soul" and the "political soul" of the patriotic leader. And in later years Heinrich von Treitschke loudly proclaimed praise of Bismarck—again only after the course of history had been decided; but this does not change the fact that the two men were profoundly different. How richly does the ability to observe and describe unfold in Bismarck's memoranda, just as in the documents of classical diplomacy which we so admire. Scorn, hatred, and antipathy are eliminated whenever he seeks to reach a judgment of persons or of the conditions of foreign powers; these emotions are voiced only where he challenges internal enemies of his work. Bismarck always kept aloof from the passionate pathos and the prejudices of the publicists. Like Metternich, he had a thoroughly sober nature. Treitschke, on the other hand, did not even want to observe and see objectively like a diplomat in order to reach the right decision, but rather thought to stir up, to "awaken" the masses—imparting life to his historical work by his temperament and eloquence rather than by literary craftsmanship and the ability to recreate a character. No one who has explored this difference by comparing samples of Bismarck's memoranda and of Treitschke's historical writings can ever imagine that Bismarck had anything in common with Hitler. It is significant that the latter venerated Treitschke while the memory of Bismarck always disturbed him.

And yet it is quite plain that Bismarck lived at a time when the impact of rising national power compelled classical diplomacy to transform itself and the methods it had developed and tested throughout the centuries. The age of the bourgeoisie and the nation-state confronted the man of affairs with new and difficult tasks which had never before existed anywhere, but it also put at his disposal means that were unknown to the older diplomats. Prince Metternich was still able to direct foreign affairs from within the cabinet; he and his

ambassadors had to deal only with potentates and courts; as first statesman, he had to court his emperor and the latter's entourage. If he understood his métier there, he was unassailable. Talleyrand began his political career in the national assembly where he learned to handle a parliament, but as foreign minister under the *Directoire* and under Napoleon he could give free play to his energy and to his virtuosity in the old diplomatic game; and he was supported in this by the military superiority of the newly created people's army, which made his position stronger than that of any diplomat of the old school had ever been. The great change brought about by the French Revolution, on the other hand, had already become apparent before the March revolution. Now it was no longer, as it used to be, the cabinets which controlled the peoples, but rather the peoples who controlled the cabinets. And thus there entered into politics an element that eluded every calculation. True, the French Revolution had shown that even political action is determined by an inner logic, a reason of state, a continuity dictated by national and historical facts; an antihistorical trend might momentarily sever that continuity, but the logic of facts would always restore it. Mirabeau often, and rightly, quoted Richelieu in support of his views; he considered himself the executor of the latter's will. Danton proclaimed the "natural frontiers" of France in the spirit of her old kings (Carnot's military might was able to reach these frontiers in a brief campaign of a few months, whereas Louis XIV had sought in vain for many years to reach the Rhine by way of Holland). But all this was possible only in France where, after the monarchy itself had created the nation, the nation subequently got rid of the monarchy it no longer needed in order to exist, while continuing the work of its former kings as a matter of course. The stateless peoples of Central and Eastern Europe did not share such a political tradition; only a relatively small group of German popular leaders seized, as a substitute, upon the tradition of the Prussian state. Everywhere, the appearance of the masses on the historical stage and the unchaining of a sovereign national will produced a historical crisis that made everything uncertain and incalculable. Yet until then political calculation had been of the very essence of diplomatic method. In this very trait it revealed itself as a true child of the Italian Renaissance and the *Saeculum mathematicum* which originated with the Venetian merchants and the great Florentines from Machiavelli to Galilei, and was continued in the spirit of Descartes and his *Discours de la méthode.*

Bismarck, too, entered into the spirit of this old school of diplomacy and learned to use its methods. Even the modern reader of his

diplomatic reports from Frankfurt or Petersburg will derive important insights and a high degree of aesthetic pleasure from the way a political situation is almost mathematically analyzed: Bismarck appraises the individual factors—the acting personalities, the resources of the state, its economic, military, and moral power; he places them in the play of forces, surveys the changing combinations, and ascertains how the foreign government to which he is accredited will react to this or that move; he discusses the probabilities and the certainties and draws his final conclusions. As long as Bismarck—as in his relations with Russia—had to deal with the Tsar, the Empress, the ministers of state, the courtiers and ladies in waiting, everything was indeed more or less foreseeable and predictable. With the rise of Pan-Slavism, a blind unfathomable will interfered with the course of events, and there was little prospect that the reason of state would prevail again soon in Eastern Europe as it had in the state of the French Revolution, to which historical and geographical factors had imparted a much more solid structure.

At home, Bismarck's position was entirely different from that of the former statesmen and diplomats of the Prussian state. Here, too, since Prussia had become a constitutional monarchy, the people made themselves heard through their representatives; and although throughout Bismarck's entire term in office it was still most important for the leading minister to possess and retain his monarch's confidence, to know how to deal with princes and princesses, lords chamberlain, and ladies of honor, it was now also necessary to win the support of the various estates for ministerial policy. In former times this had certainly not been among the obligations of Continental diplomacy, or of the leaders of foreign policy which it had produced. Bismarck himself rose in the parliamentary rather than in the diplomatic career; it was his conduct as representative in the Prussian *Landtag* that had first attracted the king's notice. Although he soon learned the métier of the professional diplomat, he always found it difficult to play the role of a minister who knows how to handle his own countrymen and their representatives with caution and prudence. A young nobleman of his time, at least if he was not the product of a military college, was prepared for the profession of a diplomat by the education of his class. Bismarck had inherited from his grandfather all those gifts which court life and cabinet policy require; in his best years, unhindered by professional duties, he had been able to acquire an education through extended journeys and wide reading; he had broadened his life experience especially by the study of history; and, above all, his exceptional gifts had en-

abled him to observe acutely, to understand men and situations, to interconnect seemingly remote factors. He knew how to find the psychologically correct approach and to proceed with circumspection in his intercourse with men, how to negotiate with prudence and determination, and how to formulate the result with precision; and he knew how to aim only for what was possible, but to pursue that forcefully. How much patience, flexibility, and energy he used in order to wrest whatever he wanted from his intractable king, to free the king from his entourage—so hostile to the leading minister—and from the legitimist party which occupied so powerful a position at court! But it was the same Bismarck whose inability to deal with a political assembly astonished contemporaries. A diplomat of the Continental states lacked all training for this job. This was stated quite correctly by the brilliant essayist Karl Hillebrand who, as early as July 1866 (immediately after the battle of Koeniggraez), pointed out in a recently rediscovered essay in the *Journal des Débats*[3] how greatly Bismarck differed in this regard from Cavour. The creator of the Italian nation-state, Hillebrand writes, knew how to bow to the will of the Chamber in order either to convert it later to his own conviction or else to resume the debate after the storm had blown over. Cavour knew how to give orders to the Chamber, while preserving the appearance of carrying out its instructions, by keeping silence whenever it seemed to him necessary to do so. He was able to hide his contempt from the deputies, something of which Bismarck was incapable. Though a parliamentary statesman, Bismarck always remained the statesman of cabinet policy, even when a different attitude was required. Time and again he provoked a public which he could no longer ignore.

That this extremely unpopular minister would very soon make his peace with the Chamber was clearly foreseen by Hillebrand at the time. The statesman who so far exceeded "the usual measure of a statesman's unpopularity" soon attained a degree of popularity such as was never achieved by any of the great representatives of classical diplomacy. For in the absolute monarchies the diplomat's life work was carried out in deliberate seclusion, in the forms of secret diplomacy. The participation of the public was undesirable; no bridge led from the king's cabinet to the heart of the people. Bismarck, however, found such a bridge and finally earned the acclaim he needed. In the past, whenever the servant of a prince sought to

[3] Karl Hillebrand, "Bismarck—ein unbekannter Aufsatz," ed. Hermann Uhde-Bernays, in *Neue Schweizer Rundschau* (June 1951), p. 67.

win popularity, he was soon wrecked by the envy of the monarchs, who could not tolerate any such diversion of the attention due the princes of the royal house. Turgot's fate is significant. And the popularity which the patriots were able to acquire usually passed away quickly. Many of them learned that there are only a few steps from the Capitol to the Tarpeian Rock; and only the dead became for the people objects of a long-lasting cult when hero worship, naturally unknown to aristocratic ages, became a popular need. To Bismarck, however, it was granted to become and to remain popular. He always remained a party man after his fashion, bound by deplorable social prejudices; but his popularity transcended party lines.

In the age of nation-states that the French Revolution created, the means and methods of the old diplomacy were changed for yet another reason: it now became possible to give a much wider scope to foreign policy than the absolute monarchies could have dared. We know the memorable strategic plan which, in the summer of 1795, the *Directoire* asked its topographical department to work out with the assistance of young General Bonaparte. According to this plan, the new people's armies were to advance along the Rivers Danube and Po to the very heart of the Austrian monarchy, in order to dictate peace before the gates of Vienna. Never before had armies been able to operate against the enemy's capital, and never before had diplomacy "dictated" peace. One had always fought for provinces only, and peace was always the result of negotiation. The campaign of 1796 did not develop quite according to plan, but in later years Napoleon often "dictated," and his opponents, the legitimate monarchs, learned from him. Therefore it was certainly nothing new when Bismarck's wars and peace treaties adopted a similar character. And yet the old statecraft remained faithful to itself in that it still considered as the goal of its endeavors the self-contained state —which now, as a nation-state, rested on the basis of political freedom and equality before the law. For the sake of this goal, the absolute monarchies had destroyed the old universal unity (according to a famous statement of Mirabeau, the idea of a single class of citizens in a centralized state would have pleased Richelieu); and for the sake of the same goal they had rounded off the frontiers which had always meant expansion. The French Revolution and the simultaneous disintegration of Poland led, for the first time, much further than this, producing unnatural and unhistorical states, and replacing the old equilibrium by anarchy in international rela-

tions. It provoked the indignation of the patriots and the peoples that stood behind them when the Vienna Congress created once more a system of states and an equilibrium among distinct states. Although Bismarck had his share in undoing the work of the Vienna Congress, and although in the hour of crisis he did not despise alliances with the popular forces, he still kept within the bounds of the old diplomacy. He gave the *coup de grâce* to universalism. He wanted to create a self-contained German national body, exactly as the Bourbon kings had created a French national body. Bismarck achieved this aim through the expansion of Prussia. But he did not abandon the policy of the balance of power; rather, he maintained it through a system of coalitions that resumed with great success the policy of alliances of the old diplomacy. It is incontestable that this policy shows many Machiavellian traits, but these certainly were not lacking with Richelieu and the old diplomacy.

Bismarck belongs in the long series of European statesmen who destroyed the unity of the Occident in order to replace it, after frightful struggles among the powers, by a new order. This order was a multitude of power states, all of which maintained themselves in mutual equilibrium by alliances and wars, and sought to regulate the surging irrational powers of the people. This was certainly not possible without a thirst for power and a love of success. But such emotions were always controlled by calculation, by reason, and above all by reason of state. Like the entire older diplomacy, Bismarck belongs to an age of organic and spiritual creation in which even the strongest personalities remain within the order of things. He cannot be placed among the demonic men of universal history who rose from subpolitical turmoils, from an unhealthy intellectualism, from the depths of incited nations or masses in revolt. There is not a single demonic trait in Bismarck: neither were his political objectives excessive nor did he employ extreme methods; and that relative indifference toward success which is also characteristic of demonic men is entirely alien to Bismarck. We must always study personalities if we venture to pass a historical judgment on transformations in the historical world. Certainly the history of Europe has been shaped by great revolutionaries. In its time, the rise of monarchical power was a tremendous revolution that disfranchised the guardians of the old order. And national sovereignty was not achieved by the self-reform of the existing powers. But those who have shaped and reshaped European life must not be confused with those Catilinean individuals who, from resentment or from demonic

urge and by exploiting the opportune moment, undertake the overthrow of all order. Such men may also claim the sanction of predecessors with whom they have nothing in common except certain traits that have developed in the modern world and without which the modern world could not exist. To assign Bismarck his proper place in the historical picture is less difficult than it seems, if one considers the essential rather than the accidental and superficial resemblances.

ON READING CHURCHILL'S "MEMOIRS"

Carl Burckhardt

WINSTON LEONARD SPENCER CHURCHILL, descendant of Marlborough, has never been looked upon without suspicion by his countrymen; but time and again he has been able to win their admiration.

As long as his nation still lived in apparent security, the conviction of its power still unshaken, Churchill was a man of unwelcome warnings, a restless critic, an innovator who quietly broke through accepted conventions. But in times of peril he became a savior. He could give all he was capable of only in the midst of catastrophes, seemingly hopeless situations, and overwhelming dangers.

Churchill's basic quality is courage—a tough, masculine courage, kindled by the fire of an ever ready aggressiveness. A part of his courage is his unquenchable gaiety, and above all, his powerful sense of humor. This sense of humor of the courageous has produced his truly poetic wealth of imagination, his forceful, simplifying way of thinking in terms of telling examples and vivid images. Churchill is both an activist, always charged with energy, and an epical writer animated by his love of reporting and of telling a story. In his speeches and writings he commands the sonorous language of the ancient *agora,* handed down by the great English schools and ending in the imperial style of the nineteenth century. It is Roman rhythm that echoes in Churchill's speeches, and his writings radiate something of the glamor of a Sallust. In his manner of expression there is always something that belongs to the past—a fact that is forgotten only when the events which Churchill influences or masters appear so overwhelming or so destructive that the world of the day, with its narrow demands and its tendency toward sterilized expression

and useful employment of stereotyped emotions, is silenced. In such moments of agony there awaken once more age-old cravings for heroic form and the grand manner. But no sooner has the danger passed than Winston Churchill, that knight without reproach and without fear, seems to become a museumpiece, like the armor of a medieval crusader, to his contemporaries, who are caught in the dreariness and distress of mechanized living. And to the drab representative of this age of ferroconcrete, to the simplifier craving for the residues of vulgarity, Churchill's words sound like a mere echo of obsolete ages in which man was complacently contented to pattern his life and death after fabricated images, contented to appear before himself and before others as the actor of an imaginary role.

Churchill has participated in every war England has waged during his lifetime; he has done so as a man of yesterday, as a "soldier of fortune." He rode in cavalry attacks, or went to the battlefield in the pay of a great newspaper because he liked to be where bullets whistled and marching songs were sung.

Later it was time and again his tenacity and courage that in decisive moments overwhelmed his countrymen's criticism of his manner—a manner that was alien not only to his time but to his country as well. He seized leadership in great affairs of state. When he was directing the course of events he acted with imagination and an iron firmness, with élan and with a kind of confident serenity that reverses were never able to dim. But he always acted for aims and according to principles of yesterday. During the First World War he thought of Carthage and of Napoleon's empire, of the Scipios and of Pitt; he entered the Second World War like a daring cavalry officer of 1914. For the time being he thought little of the burden of the future; he thought only of victory.

Churchill's concept of freedom and of the dignity of man is Christian, hierarchical, and English. To him, the ideal form of government is the constitutional monarchy in the democratic state of the Western type, with aristocratic correctives. He is convinced that private property is morally necessary. He is practical and unphilosophical, stubborn, impatient, and violent if his convictions are attacked.

If he considers war inevitable, it is because he thinks he has noticed that England's position in the world is in danger of being impaired; or because he has found that his particular notions of freedom and human dignity are in jeopardy, or because the sanctity of private property is endangered. When he is waging war, he has but one thought: to win it. In order to win it, he enters alliances in which

his convictions, which he declares to be the battle cry of the new coalition, are badly mauled. Grave confusions follow: England's ancient concept of freedom with its hierarchical order and its rules of fair play are mixed up with the American concept of equality and the French concept of liberty that is never quite free of anarchical tendencies. Churchill's democratic creed must always, by hook or by crook, dovetail with certain convictions of his allies—for example, with the interpretation of "democracy" in modern Russia where this much-used term connotes the delegation of sovereignty, the concentration (according to Marxian methods) of the theoretically dictatorial powers of the so-called proletariat in the hands of a few functionaries with the powers of the police—the very opposite of Churchill's own convictions. But while war is being waged the term "democracy" becomes a cold, lifeless framework that gives a deceptive unity to the most diversified, mutually conflicting forms of sovereignty.

Churchill has participated in the victory celebrations after two world wars. He has had a decisive personal part in the winning of both victories. But the country for which he has earned these victories has gained little from them; in fact, the second triumph has stripped it of decisive positions of power. The First World War had already rendered Churchill's principles questionable; at the outbreak of the Second these principles were seemingly still sufficiently effective to produce a great propagandistic effect upon his contemporaries. But in the hands of their advocates the ideal values, for which one had supposedly fought, were transformed into their very opposites.

Principles and ideologies are more dangerous than weapons. If, for the sake of a decision on the field of battle, alliances are concluded on the basis of principles that one rejects or even abhors, one inevitably risks losing victory on the field of battle because these abhorred principles have also triumphed on the field of battle. Thus everything is lost for which one has fought. That is exactly what has happened to Churchill. At the end of the First World War he had no really decisive influence on the course of events; and he has since then with sharpness and lucidity, criticized the mistakes made by others. At the end of the Second World War, however, it was *his* turn; but in every move his hand was guided by his two strongest allies. In order to win a complete victory he had forsaken the first good for which he had gone into battle: he had forsaken freedom, hence also the freedom of action. In order to preserve a fighting spirit at home, he had lost the domestic freedom of his own country to the power of the State, had surrendered to the power of the State

the sanctity of private property, and had sacrificed the hierarchy that for centuries had guaranteed England's equilibrium. England's internal structure had changed in favor of state socialism; her external structure in favor of anticolonialism. It was a great, slow English Revolution that had won victory in Churchill's country, transforming everything on the surface as well as in the depths, and realizing principles every one of which was opposed to the wartime Premier's innermost nature. And the fundamental principle of traditional English foreign policy—the European balance of power—had given way to a European vacuum, and to complete disequilibrium.

Against the ideological powers and their consequence, which he himself had allowed to grow—against his will but for the sake of his abiding goal, military victory—Churchill fought everywhere, at home and abroad. He fought with his old vigor, as he has done so often in his astonishing career that seems to brim over with activity. He fought once again as a man of yesterday, undaunted; courageously and tenaciously as always, he attacked as directly and as frontally as possible. One is reminded of a man riding a cavalry charge with drawn saber. But Churchill's opponents were no old-fashioned lancers. They had at their disposal the firepower of modern weapons. It was too late. Churchill could no longer rid himself of the spirits whose help he had invoked. He had fought against absolutism; he now had to realize that it is absolutism that rules even when its powers are wielded by a majority of but a few votes. Churchill had to recognize that liberalism will always go further than its advocates intend, often to the very edge of what these advocates consider an abyss. He had to learn that if the State seeks to abolish inequality and to relieve suffering, the only means at its disposal is to deprive one class and to enrich another, a process in which both are impoverished. Churchill had to look on as the British Empire that had been created by the pioneering spirit and the initiative of individuals had to turn, for its survival, to the tutelage of state control, by which the pioneering spirit must inevitably be paralyzed. And he had to watch as from the ashes of Hitler's empire and his plans for world domination there arose states which even today rule half the world—and tomorrow perhaps all of it; states that have replaced National Socialist propaganda—which used to be entirely ineffective beyond Germany's frontiers—by a propaganda to which decisive parts of the population in all countries have succumbed.

There are rare human beings who are predestined for leadership in times of peril. Churchill is one of the purest embodiments of this type. Even rarer are the true statesmen—men, that is, who are able

to view even the most extreme peril and the way to meet it in the light of the future, and every act from the viewpoint of its remotest consequences. To their contemporaries, such statesmen are always incomprehensible; they are unable to sway the masses, they are unpopular; at a time when everything depends on the verdict of public opinion, they are really unthinkable. They become possible only in the sphere of danger—that is, where public opinion, as the last consequence of its own free exercise, abolishes itself and a single individual assumes its place. Woe if this individual is not the right one, and this will almost inevitably happen when he embodies the wishful image of the masses ready to surrender themselves. The true statesman must free himself from his own age; he must be at home in the future and also in the past, inasmuch as the past harbors values which remain inalienably and unchangeably valid.

Churchill has always remained conscious of these enduring values of yesterday which have been tested in every crisis. But he seems to have lacked that foresight into the future which, indispensable to true statesmanship, must forever and everywhere be present as the judgment of the deeds we commit to further our aims and to save the values we believe in.

In his copious memoirs* Churchill has dealt with the actions that were carried out under his decisive direction or control, and with the consequences of these actions. In his old age he has, as always in the course of his rich life, untiringly, with sharp eyes and a stout heart, written the chronicle of the epoch he helped to shape, as it appears from his own unique point of view. These memoirs, with their recognition of errors committed, their apologies, their judgments, will themselves be subject to judgment even in the remote future. Already they arouse opposition and assent; the facts, as these memoirs depict them, are readily believed or critically questioned; they are still far from certain. But they reveal a personality, a power, a temperament that ought to give pause to those who are ready to explain every historical figure as the pure product of sociological and material factors. In order to be consistent they would have to conclude that the circumstances that made a Churchill possible were worthy of man's efforts and worthy of preservation.

* Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948).

RELIGION AS SELF-THERAPY

EMERSON IN ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE

Austin Warren

Long ago, Emerson became a scripture, a church, a vested interest. At the head table of the banquet for Mark Twain or any other promising talent, he sits with the other senile eminences whose reasons for eminence are forgotten. Before his death and till well past the end of his century, Emerson had—for New Englanders, and others—much of that spiritual tyranny against which he had inveighed: he in turn was read by "meek young men in libraries," and cited as final authority by "the late George Apley." To us now, his most famous essays, "Self-Reliance" and "The Oversoul," are offensively oracular.

But to take Emerson as an oracle, or orator, or a systematic philosopher is to mistake him. After the fashion of his Puritan ancestors in England and New England, he is a self-analyst, a diarist, the writer of spiritual memoirs and "spiritual letters." Whatever comparable rank we assign him, the names with which his belongs are those of Montaigne, Pascal, Amiel, Nietzsche. He is not primarily a "maker," either of poetry or philosophy, but a self-explorer.

Like his approximate contemporaries, Marx and Kierkegaard, Emerson thought that ideas should have consequences. Said Marx: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it." Said Kierkegaard: "In the early days of antiquity, the philosopher was a power, moral power, character; the [Roman] empire safeguarded itself by recompensing them, by making them into dons. The don is the eunuch; but he is not emasculated himself for the sake of the Kingdom of Heaven but on the contrary in order to fit better with this characterless world." A Harvard man, Emerson felt the timidity of the academic mind, saw how the flight from oneself and society might flatteringly name it-

self as detachment, disinterestedness, and objectivity. A New Englander, he found the Boston of his time lacking in conviction and consequently in force. Upon such an audience, one must enjoin audacity. "It is a sort of maxim with me," says Emerson, "never to harp on the omnipotence of limitations. Least of all do we need any suggestion of *checks* and *measures,* as if New England were anything else."

Attacking caution, Emerson addresses first the New England in himself. The great preacher denounces his own obsessive sins; replies, over and over, to his own recurrent skepticisms. The psychiatrist had private need for health. The true savior has been saved.

Fatherless at eight, Emerson was reared by his mother and his brilliant, strange Aunt Mary. The family poverty was constricting and humiliating. Two of his brothers died of tuberculosis; he feared the same early death, and, till forty, suffered recurrently from his lungs. More generally, he thought of himself always as lacking positive health—"animal spirits," "vital force."

The *Journals* document Emerson's adolescence. He was early a penetrating self-analyst: later he must have thought these harsh rebukes of self, these stresses on lacks and deficiencies, unwholesome. As an undergraduate at Harvard, he was painfully given to desiring this man's art and that man's scope, finding himself inferior in one and another respect, castigating himself for failures and his sloth. At seventeen, he writes of "feeling the humiliating sense of dependence and inferiority, which, like the goading, soul-sickening sense of extreme poverty, palsies efforts." At nineteen, he takes relentless stock: "I am he who nourished brilliant visions of future grandeur. . . ." "Shall I resign every aspiration to belong to that family of giant minds . . . hallowed by time and the approbation of ages?" But he charges himself with being "too tired and too indolent to travel up the mountain path" to glory. As for his heart, he analyzes: "Ungenerous and selfish, cautious and cold, I yet wish to be romantic; [yet] have not sufficient feeling to speak a natural hearty welcome to a friend or stranger. . . ." He was attracted to his opposites—like the elegantly clad and urbane Gourdins, South Carolinians, or Martin Gay, whom, for several years, he never could bring himself to address, or Achille Murat, whom he met during the enforced valetudinarian winter in Florida.

Emerson's famous optimism was an acquisition. He was natively introverted, self-conscious, socially embarrassed—without small talk, handy practical skills, the assurance of wealth or physical presence. In his late essay, "Success," he spoke out of his own casebook when,

replying to doubtless older New Englanders who professed belief in the wholesome effect of reproof and censure, he wrote: "I have seen scores of people who can silence me, but I seek one who shall make me forget or overcome the frigidities and imbecilities into which I fall. . . ." "A cynic can chill and dishearten me with a single word. Despondency comes readily enough to the most sanguine. . . ." He preached self-reliance and courage and cheerfulness because he felt their lack; in the admirable phrase which Kenneth Burke applied to William James, Emerson "wrote what was necessary to sustain him."

The crisis in Emerson's life occurred in his thirtieth year when he resigned his pastorate at the Second Church of Boston. For a frail cultivated young man without "means," such a decision was —to speak prudentially—heroic. Withdrawal from a profession of which the restraints, whether ritual or doctrinal, were so slight, struck some of his clerical colleagues as "Quakerish." There were, says his official biographer, Cabot, "loud whispers of mental derangement." John Quincy Adams notes in his journals: "A son of my once-loved friend William Emerson, and a classmate of my lamented George, after failing in the everyday avocations of a Unitarian preacher and schoolmaster, starts a new doctrine of Transcendentalism. . . ." The particular issue with the Second Church, his scrupulous refusal to celebrate the Lord's Supper, was but specimen and symptom, surely, and so appeared to his sensible contemporaries. Emerson hoped for a professorship of rhetoric at such a college as Bowdoin or Colby or Middlebury; but no chair was offered. What reason to think that, installed, he would not discover some scruple —refuse to employ a textbook, or decline to lecture on mornings when he found he had nothing really to say?

So Emerson passed from being priest with hieratic tenure to being an itinerant prophet. According to Dr. Holmes, a King's Chapel Unitarian, he "accepted a precarious employment, which hardly kept him above poverty, rather than wear the *golden padlock* on his lips which has held fast the conscience of so many pulpit Chrysostoms."

Furthermore, Emerson left the state church of "greater" Boston, the Unitarian, without assurance that he had any better equivalent to offer society. Returning from Europe in 1833, he could not honestly wish away the dominant religion of rural New England. "I see or believe in the wholesomeness of Calvinism for thousands and thousands. . . . Ah me! what hope of reform . . . if they who have what they call the light are so selfish and timid and cold, and their

faith so impractical and, in their judgment, so unsuitable for the middling classes."

To this skepticism, he never found a theoretical answer. The journal entry goes on, however, to his practical decision: "This my charge, plain and clear, to act faithfully upon my own faith; to live by it myself, and see what a hearty obedience to it will do." Not for him the position of pragmatism, of saying what one believed the community needed to hear, even though the teacher or preacher couldn't himself privately believe it. Emerson must say only what he saw.

During his preparation for the ministry, and even more persistently during his brief pastorate, Emerson had sought for the ultimate psychological and moral grounds of religion. Authority of persons, even divine persons, must, he concluded, be derivative from some ultimate ground of self-evidence in ethical law or the nature of things. He did not doubt the psychological and social power of religion in the past; but he believed it must be possible to translate that power into spiritual laws which, not upon authority, a modern man could accept.

On his Uncle Ladd's farm one summer, Emerson worked at haying with a Methodist laborer who, "though ignorant and rude, had some deep thoughts." All men are always praying, he said; and all their prayers are answered. On this theme, Emerson preached his first sermon, in his Uncle Ripley's Parish Church at Waltham, drawing from his friend's spiritual postulates the warning that we should be careful that we pray for the right things.

Under "prayer," Emerson subsumes the directed action of the will and the imagination, all psychological and moral (as distinguished from physical) force. It is self-definition, recollection, concentration. In his first book, *Nature,* he speaks of "the action of man upon nature with his entire force . . . [of] many obscure . . . facts now arranged under the name of Animal Magnetism, prayer, eloquence, self-healing. . . ." In his late *Conduct of Life,* the Waltham sermon recurs, translated into "What we pray to ourselves for is always granted."

During his Boston pastorate, Emerson filled his journals with meditations on spiritual laws. He developed—or at least repeated, rephrased, and illustrated—what at twenty-three he called "my own notions of compensation," attributing the doctrine, if not the word, to Bishop Butler's *Analogy.* One kind of apologist for religion undertakes to argue the existence of a better world from the manifest chaos and misery of this; but, like the Cambridge Platonists, Shaftes-

bury and Butler, Emerson was unsatisfied by such *argument from defect,* believing that we infer a future perfect justice from the evidence of justice, however imperfect, operating in this present world.

Under "compensation" Emerson subsumes his whole conception "spiritual laws"—two distinct ideas, each of which has claims historic to the term. The first is that of justice as counterbalance between deformities, or deficiencies, and talents; it is the Adlerian "compensation," the psychological law by which a felt inferiority may incite a man to a retrieving triumph. The second is the conception of justice as correspondence between cause and effect, work and wage; it is the Oriental law of Karma; it is the principle enunciated by Jesus that "Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap." Early journals and late essays abound in illustration and application of these "spiritual laws." On counterbalance: "Every defeat in one manner is made up in another. Every suffering is rewarded, every debt is paid." On correspondence: "The thief steals from himself; —whoso borrows runs into his own debt. . . ." "Do you not see that every misfortune is misconduct, that every honor is desert, that every affront is an insolence of your own?"

Of the two motifs subsumed under "compensation," the more basic to Emerson, as we might expect, is not counterbalance (ultimately the argument from defect, the irrational leap) but correspondence (like begets like). And increasingly important to him is the insistence that "compensation" is always *in kind.* Like virtue, so learning is its own reward. The rewards of religion, like the "evidences" adduced in its "proof," must themselves be religious. Vigorously, Emerson ridiculed the "vulgar" doctrine of post-mortem rewards and punishments. He had listened to at least one orthodox preacher whose sermon implied that Christians would have, after death, " '*such* a good time as the sinners have now;' or, to push it to its extreme import, 'you sin now; we shall sin by and by. . . .' " But heaven—as Emerson had read in the Cambridge Platonists or Swedenborg, or *passim* in spiritual writers and mystics, corroborating his own insight—is first a state and only secondarily, or correspondentially, a place; and we cannot possibly "go to heaven" unless we already have heaven within us, unless we are already in heaven.

In Emerson's latest essays, the spiritual laws of compensation continue to engage him. Means must correspond to ends: "If I strike, I am struck; if I chase, I am pursued." Forms of aggression provoke counter-assault, or at least the reaction of resentment. Aggression begets aggression. From this and other "vicious circles" one can make his way out only through self-analysis and reorientation.

"What would it avail me if I could *destroy my enemies?* There would be as many to-morrow. That which I hate and fear is really in myself, and no knife is long enough to reach its heart." There is nothing to hate save hate; and nothing to fear save fear. When I can love my enemies, I shall have none: that is, I shall not think of them as enemies.

Between the earlier essays and those in the later volumes ("Fate," "Power," "Success," and "Courage"), there is, however, a shift of proportion, emphasis, tone. Mystical discourses like "The Oversoul" disappear, as do, chiefly, theological terms. The new essays, realistic in outlook and diction, are meditations in "practical psychology." In the lineage of "self-reliance," they go back, of course, to Emerson's own experience and the self-explorations carried on in the journals; they restate, simply, what he had learned from his self-therapy. It is of these essays that Charles Baudouin is thinking when, in *Suggestion and Autosuggestion,* he calls Emerson "The great pioneer in preaching the gospel of moral force." It is the Emerson of these essays from whom Nietzsche and William James gained direction and impetus. Of James's basic types, Emerson is specimen and progenitor of the "once born," those whose depressions and malaises the "faith cure" can dispel. The more severe neurosis of powerful, tormented, divided natures, in need of the drastic therapy of conversion, Emerson did not understand from experience; but his grasp of orthodox religion, in psychological terms (as healing and power), gives backing to James's whole treatment of religion as "religious experience."

Like Emerson, Irving Babbitt desired to unite East and West; and, like Emerson, he judged the East to have preserved the purer tradition in religion. Though preaching "humanism" (the middle way of Aristotle and Confucius) to other Westerners, Babbitt himself was a "Buddhist" of the austere Hinayanist school—that is, one who affirmed, on "positive and experimental" grounds, the nature of man's suffering and the way of salvation from suffering. Emerson's attempt to restate, positively and experimentally, what Western orthodoxy had stated on dogmatic and institutional authority, was Babbitt's motive for the homage to Emerson so unexpectedly proffered in the conclusion to *Masters of French Criticism.* Babbitt's "higher will" is Emerson's "oversoul"; his "higher imagination" is Emerson's favorite agency, the creator of ideal images of moral action. The "higher will" is "compensation"; the "higher imagination" is "prayer."

But Babbitt, and Aldous Huxley after him, draw back from Emerson's inability to distinguish between the power of religion as such and the power of spiritual religion. There are religions and religions. As good Father Taylor, the Methodist preacher, said, shaking his fist at the Calvinist Park Street Church, "Your God is my devil." As the Renaissance used to distinguish between "black magic" and "white magic," we have to try the spirits, whether they be of God or not, remembering that miracles can be worked by diabolism as well as by sanctity.

Emerson fails, on the whole, to differentiate between the power of holiness and the power of any kind of conscious concentration and discipline. In the essay on "Demonology," to be sure, he warns: "The best are never demonical or magnetic [*cf.* Mrs. Eddy's 'malicious animal magnetism']; leave this limbo to [Satan] the Prince of the power of the air. The lowest angel is better. . . . *Power as such is not known to the angels.*" But he does not often sound this warning. The reason was primarily, I judge, a lack of personal need: he was not tempted by the *libido dominandi.* His "message"—first to himself, and then to others—is that the man of contemplation need not cringe before the man of action, as the powerless before the powerful; for meditation and contemplation are the only ultimate forms of action and hence of power.

In Emerson's formative years, he had seen the "scholar" (his name for the "intellectual," whatever his mode of existence) intimidated by the seeming solidity of finance capitalism. He saw himself and his friends as good but *powerless.* Yet why were they powerless? Because, ignorant of spiritual laws, they were afraid. How absurd! Money, institutions, and buildings, though they seem ultimate realities, are but the incarnations—or, at their sorry worst, the petrified incarnations—of ideas and faith. Said Emerson, quoting Voltaire, " 'tis the misfortune of worthy people that they are cowards."

INACTIVE LEISURE

André Varagnac

If one observes the life of peoples attentively, one will see that it is a constant sociological experiment and adjustment. The different rates of cultural transformation on two different continents offer us a diversity of valuable evidence for making significant comparisons. They help us to reach at least tentative conclusions concerning cultural values. If a knowledge of American life can show Europeans the directions in which their coming economic evolution is oriented, Europe, less completely evolved, can in turn permit the American observer to understand better what stages his country has already passed through in its more rapid economic evolution.

Doubtless such observations would have only a historical interest, if evolution always consisted only in progress in all spheres, if in moving forward we were invariably moving upward in so far as human values are concerned. But nothing authorizes us to take so optimistic a view, to indulge in such wishful thinking. A sound scientific view must first of all defer such a value–judgment and concern itself objectively with the collection of data.

It is in this spirit that contemporary European sociology observes recent industrial transformations and their effects on the common man. These effects are of two kinds: on man as an industrial producer; and on man as a consumer, voluntary or involuntary, of the products of industry.

Economic historians tend to treat the industrial revolution of the last century and a half as though it consisted only in a gigantic multiplication of the quantity of manufactured commodities. Certainly the mass character acquired by production is the most obvious and the most spectacular aspect of that revolution. But from the point of view of the cultural historian it is not at all certain that it is the most important aspect.

We must of course take note of the difference between the man of the eighteenth century, who procured his furnishings, his clothing, his tools only slowly and with difficulty, and the man of the twentieth century, who lives in the midst of a jungle of easily ob-

tained goods, which even pursue him through their advertisements. But the more fundamental difference lies in this: the common man of the eighteenth century *made for himself,* with the co-operation of his family, almost all the things necessary to his life. More specifically: he made them with his own hands, with only domesticated animals, windmills, and watermills to supplement *the motive power of his own muscles.* The man of the twentieth century, on the other hand, whether as producer or as consumer, is the mere auxiliary of machines which he sets in motion or whose movement he completes.

It is this substitution of the machine for man in the industrial revolution that has transformed what the historians call "modern times." The part played by man in production has not stopped diminishing, and this has long engaged the attention of industrial psychologists, who have described this change and have studied its consequences. At the same time *the part played by human activity in consumption has not stopped diminishing,* and this other immense event has not yet been sufficiently observed or analyzed. In the past, it was the daily effort of millions of pairs of human arms that made use of the stock of tools; today, it is the functioning of millions of motors that serve us, often without effort on our part. Through the actions of these motors, the things around us come to consume themselves more than we consume them.

Undoubtedly the physical labor of men has diminished immensely, but we have not yet begun to consider the impressive cultural effect of this double transformation; and the experience of European daily life—in which this revolution is less advanced, in which handicraft production still survives—can provide the basis for comparisons that will enable us to extend our view to the consequences of machine consumption.

In considering the diminishing role of man in production, we can turn to a recent study by Georges Friedmann, a French specialist in industrial psychology, who has conducted his inquiries in European as well as in American factories.[1] He points out that the old handicraft professions were autonomous and that they literally divided into individual tasks in the manner described by Adam Smith, that Taylor and Ford have separated the thought of the operative from his work (a separation which is growing in the distinction between the bureau of research and the workshop), that the artisan's knowledge of his materials is being replaced by the function of the me-

[1] See his article, "De quelques incidences psychologiques, sociales, et morales dans l'évolution contemporaine des métiers industriels" in *l'Année Sociologique,* II (1940–48) 528 ff. See also his more recent *Où va le travail humain?* (Paris, 1950).

chanic. Man is left without knowledge of the materials he uses, and knows only the mechanical tool which intervenes between the material and himself. We are always expecting that a worker in a given process will be eventually eliminated by automatic machinery, and this, combined with the mechanical nature of the labor, makes the work virtually unconscious and favors daydreaming, as is shown by the playing of music in the workshops.

If we limit ourselves to essential observations, these are the very serious conclusions that come out of the works of Georges Friedmann and certain psychotechnicians. Occupations consist less and less in personal activities; they make less and less appeal to the whole of the action potential of the paid worker; indeed, an increasing part of the manual operations in the factory is better accomplished in so far as the worker detaches himself from his work through daydreaming or conversation. Before the time of machines, handicraft labor mobilized the whole of the strength and aptitudes of the worker, and this integral nature of employment helped slowly but increasingly from day to day to form his personality. But contemporary psychologists in various countries observe a decrease in the personality of the factory worker, accompanied by an increase in his need for instructions, for direction from above. And this is the same worker who only a century ago was concerned above all with his freedom to think, to make all his judgments for himself.

Constance Reavely and John Winnington[2] have shown the serious implications of this aspect of industrial transformation for the future of democracies—systems based on a multiplicity of individual consciences, of autonomous citizens. Doubtless the historian of the future will find in these unattended psychological consequences of mechanization one of the main reasons for the present success of communism among the workers in European factories.

Let us reply, in passing, to the question: why does this political tendency, so evident in Europe, not appear in the United States? It is because industry in the United States develops in a completely different social milieu. The industrial societies of Europe are the direct heirs of feudal societies with rigid caste systems, whereas the American industrial society was born in a society of pioneers; it has no classes as impermeable as those of Europe. But the political aspect of mechanization is not the only one to be considered. The cultural consequences are no less significant. In order to understand their im-

[2] In their recent book, *Industry and Democracy* (London, Chatto and Windus, 1947), of which a brilliant review by Georges Friedmann appeared in the April 1949 issue of *Annales* (Paris, Colin).

portance, it is no longer enough for psychology to analyze the effects of mechanization on the work of production; it must also observe the transformations in the nature of consumption.

There, too, upheavals have rapidly followed, one after the other, for over a century, and in a direction which accentuates the effects brought about by machine production. Parallel to the growth of specialization, mass production has imposed normalization. The reduction of the almost infinite diversification of the old handicraft products to certain limited types results in the reduction of the number of occasions on which the personality of the consumer can express itself in the choice of goods. Custom-made goods have disappeared almost completely.

The consumption of premechanized products, such as custom-made goods, in many cases required the knowledge of the consumer. The product of handicraft implied not only the skill of the maker, but that of the user as well. In Paris, in my childhood, one would judge the dexterity of a person by the way in which he used a pair of tongs to place coals in the fireplace. Listening to music did not mean, as it does today, that one sat down and twiddled the dial on a radio; one played an instrument oneself, whether well or badly. The European kitchen today provides only a small proportion of the varied dishes of the past, but many housewives find in the culinary arts their only remaining opportunity to acquire a modest prestige, their one chance to express themselves.

Just as the processes of production are tending to eliminate the human element from the product, so all consumption is depending more and more on prefabricated products. Thus in his role of consumer no less than in his role of producer the average man of our time is falling more and more into a dependence on anonymous specialists, who prepare the material and spiritual means to provide for all his needs. He is becoming a parasite on the inventions of others.

It is in the sphere of leisure that this transformation is the most arresting and the most clearly dangerous to the future of our capacities for cultural creation. What is the psychological function of leisure? The most natural answer is: rest. And yet man has never been satisfied with that optimum form of rest which is constituted by sleep. The very idea of leisure implies a waking state, in which the individual may act free from all occupational obligations. What were the leisure occupations before mechanization? They consisted in the class of things known as folklore: dancing, singing, telling stories, organizing games, giving parties, dressing in disguises, creating the

objects of popular art, and especially putting on farces, posing riddles, mutual teasing (without real malice). The old expression "to make merry" indicates clearly enough how essential activity was to leisure.

Doubtless our modern existence does present new sports, new forms of play in the open air. Still, these consist too often in mere regulated assemblages of persons who have come to watch others play. The appearance of sports coincides in a characteristic fashion with the ascendancy of mechanization: the muscular forces, eliminated from industry, have produced a "lone rider," so to speak, and thus it is that modern sport has come forth culturally inferior to the games of preindustrial times. Modern sport is an activity essentially channelized toward the functioning of the musculature, frequently toward the exclusive activity of certain muscles. It is a specialization comparable to professional specialization. The proof of this is that sport cannot be considered as favoring intellectual activity, which must be included in any pursuit which is to involve the entire personality.

Thus, in his work, in his consumption, in his leisure, modern man appears to be oriented toward fragmentary activities and toward a growing passivity. We repeat that these disquieting aspects of industrial progress are compensated in the United States by the immense collective effervescence of the melting pot of the world. The United States is constantly creating too many novelties for its citizens not to feel stirred by a kind of general, though indeterminate, human activity. But this stimulating historical experience may also help to conceal from them certain deficiencies of our machine civilization, deficiencies which threaten the future of world culture, and which European observers are perhaps better situated to point out.

We might, it is true, accept this transformation of the popular life, persuading ourselves that culture depends only on an elite, and that it is enough that this elite preserves its individual liberties and expressions. A strange error of judgment! In a civilization everything is interdependent, despite the barriers of caste or class. This "cultivated elite" participates in the same processes of production, of consumption, of leisure. It, too, is menaced by the spell of passivity. Is it not also exposed to radio, to movies, to television? Does it not own still more accommodating automobiles, embellished with even more than the ordinary number of obliging mechanisms?

We must return this problem to the framework of the basic ideas of the biological sciences: new usages appear in different environ-

ments; they adapt to them, and the various adaptations produce variously modified forms and their multiple copies. The process of adaptation is the same with the creations of the mind. It is common knowledge that in athletics the appearance of champions in a particular country depends upon the extent of the practice of athletics among the whole of that country's population. It is the same with culture. Therefore it is threatening to the spiritual potential of the nations of tomorrow that at present such a large proportion of men should fall into dependence on needs which depersonalize and on a passivity which dries up the ability, and even the desire, to individualize the self.

—*Translated by* NANNI KAHN

IS GOD A MATHEMATICIAN?

Hans Jonas

FROM THE INTRINSIC evidence of his creation, the Great Architect of the Universe now begins to appear as a pure mathematician." In its broader implications, this statement by the late Sir James Jeans[1] calls for philosophical comment. To some extent, this has been ably done by the late Suzan Stebbing in her refreshing book *Philosophy and the Physicists.* On the following pages I shall attempt to examine the proposition with respect to one particular mode of existence within the universe, namely that of living organisms. Jeans' assertion raises the question whether the mathematician that is the great architect of the universe is also the architect, great or little, of the amoeba. He must be both, or he is neither. For the amoeba is part of the universe and must be accountable for by its creative principle. Its minuteness is no disability in ontological relevance. Its intrinsic evidence, as a creation, forms part of the general evidence, and must be heard all the more as in this instance "intrinsic" has a deeper meaning than is true of any other class of cosmic beings: it includes the fact of its own inwardness or awareness. This gives it a preferential status in ontological evidence that outweighs its quantitative limitations. In other words, if life is not within the competence of an alleged cosmic principle, though it is in every sense within the cosmos, then that principle is inadequate for the cosmos as well. The alternative would be a metaphysical transcendence of life which, though perhaps conceded in the case of conscious man, would hardly be accorded to the amoeba. That is to say, the remedy of dualism is inoperable in the explanation of organism. Thus material life (we are not yet speaking of mind and consciousness) can serve as a touchstone for interpretations of matter or world-stuff, and can rectify a conception of God built on such interpretations. In this sense, the metaphysical statement "God is a mathematician" can be reduced to a definite ontological view, and checked against knowledge of plain facts: the whole proposition is brought down from the dizzy heights of stars and spaces to our immediate and most intimate experience;

[1] J. H. Jeans, *The Mysterious Universe* (Cambridge, University Press, 1933), p. 122.

but it still retains its full application to cosmology, and hence to the speculative question of what God may be—if indeed the world has anything to say about Him. Jeans' statement implies this by accepting the world's recognizable being as "evidence for." In taking him at his word, we do not share his confidence. But even if the evidence is not accorded a positive bearing on what God is (let alone on whether He is), a negative bearing—regarding what God is not, or is not exclusively—would be implicit in its mere excess over what would be attributable to a Creator of this or that hypothetical nature. Since that nature has been derived in the first place from a certain reading of the evidence of creation, it is actually this reading that is tested when we try out the inferred concept of God on the experiential basis to which it makes final appeal. The concept of a mathematical God, when applied to reality in earnest, elicits the utter possibilities—merits or faults—inherent in the underlying ontological or epistemological outlook. If this should result in a *reductio ad absurdum,* the impossible concept has at least served a useful if self-defeating purpose.

Jeans' dictum comes late in a long and venerable tradition that is almost coextensive with the history of Western speculation. From the Demiurge of the *Timaeus* there is a direct line of descent to Leibniz' Deity creative of the mathematically compossible. "Thus it is wonderfully made known to us how in the very origination of things a certain Divine mathematics or metaphysical mechanics is employed and the greatest quantity is brought into existence [*lit.,* the determination of the greatest quantity takes place]."[2] "When God calculates and employs thought, the world is made."[3] The theistic reference apart, we see the Pythagorean conception of a mathematical essence of the universe revived, at the very threshold of modern physical science, in Kepler's *harmonia mundi,* of which he understood his laws of planetary motion to be exhibitions; or in Galileo's credo that the great book of the universe is written in mathematical language, the symbols of which are triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures.[4] Correlative to this conception of being is one of knowledge. To

[2] Leibniz, "On the Ultimate Origination of Things" (1697), *The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings,* trans. Robert Latta (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1898), p. 342.

[3] *Op. cit.,* p. 342, n. 18, citing "De connexione inter res et verba" (1677).

[4] "Philosophy is written in that great book which ever lies before our eyes—I mean the universe—but we cannot understand it if we do not first learn the language and grasp the symbols in which it is written. This book is written in the mathematical language, and the symbols are triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures, without whose help it is impossible to comprehend a single word of it, without which one wanders in vain through a dark labyrinth."

Kepler quantity is the knowable part of reality, and cognition means measurement and comparison of measurements. And poles apart as are Hobbes' nominalism and the idealistic tradition of the Continent, his contention that to think is essentially to compute, that is, in the last resort to add and subtract, is related to Leibniz' idea of a universal calculus. But here already we notice a significant difference from the classical—Pythagorean or Platonic—tradition, vigorously as this was invoked by the founders of the modern method: the mathematics employed is algebra rather than geometry. This alone would suggest that it does not deal with the intuitive objects of Greek ontological speculation. We may use this observation as a lead to uncover the more profound differences separating the modern from the classical conception of a "mathematical nature," and thus to determine the precise meaning that must attach to Jeans' idea of a mathematical Deity within the context of modern science.

It was the interest in motion that determined the ascendance of algebraic method in physical description. In the early stages of modern science, analysis of becoming supplanted contemplation of being. The "forms" here envisaged are no longer those of the terminal products but those of the continuous processes of nature. Process, as such, is defined solely by its own form, that is, the law of the series, and in no way by its end (of which there is none), or any temporary formations en route. Now, while Greek geometry had considered the relations of unchanging figures and bodies, algebra—in analytical geometry and in the integral calculus—permitted representation of the geometrical form itself as a function of variables, that is, a phase in their continuous growth, and formulation of the laws of its "generation." These laws became the true objects of mathematical cognition, instead of the determinate forms, which had lost their independent status for that of a transitional limit.

What in the purely mathematical field appeared as the functional consideration supplanting the static one of intuitive entities, amounts in the field of physical description to the dissolution of the "substantial forms" of classical ontology into the elementary motions and forces by which they can be thought (and experimentally shown) to be generated. In this application, the functional generation of a mathematical curve becomes the mechanical generation of the path of a body. Here the product, namely, the form of the path, is not a complete, simultaneously present entity, but a sequence, that is, a series of instants, each of them determined anew by the component factors at that very instant. It has no reality of its own. Now if such a series, viewed as an ideal whole, shows the attributes of rational

"form" and proportion, in the sense of classical geometry, as Kepler found with reverent admiration in the planetary orbits, this is not due to intrinsic reason, or an aspiration toward "harmony," in the moving principle, but—as Newton subsequently showed in his mechanics of those motions—to the mere uniformity or constancy of the elementary factors involved. These—in the present case, gravitation and inertia—would each result in rectilinear motion only, the simplest and least "formed" of all motions: yet their mere addition cannot but result, on the sole condition of their staying constant,[5] and without any aspiration toward such a result, in the highly rational forms of celestial geometry. This is the sole remaining sense of saying that the courses obey a rule (capable of mathematical expression): it is the sufficient reason of order and law in nature. Thus rationality of order does not account for itself, intelligible form no longer represents perfection of being, obtaining reality on that very account in preference to lower forms, but has itself to be explained by reference to the lowest, that is, most elementary, types of event: and the latter, far from being transformed or even affected by their entrance into the more articulated order, constitute this by mere persistence in their own unarticulated quantity. This alone is the basically real, the wholeness of their conjoint result being only apparent, enjoying neither epistemologically nor ontologically an integral status of its own. This is the import of the modern analysis, which transformed the celestial mathematics of the ancients into the very different thing that is celestial mechanics, that is, a case of mechanics in general.[6] The Pythagorean harmony has become the balance of unconcerned forces, calculable from the conditions of their meeting. The "measure" and the "mean" no longer bind the opposites, but are their inevitable sum.

Thus the relation of higher and lower, of more or less rational (more or less form), is replaced by that of complex and simple, and the

[5] Or, if they were variable, the condition would be that the variation be subject to constants: the essential for the possibility of laws of nature is the prevailing of any constants whatsoever, provided that between them they "distribute" the whole range of natural phenomena.

[6] Galileo expressed himself "traditionally" when he said that the symbols of Nature's mathematical language were triangles, circles, and the like. Though triangles may occur as auxiliary constructions in dynamic analysis, and conic sections do actually result from the dynamics of nature, it would have been more adequate to the whole scientific trend which Galileo himself inaugurated if he could have said that the symbols were constants and variables, functions and equations: in brief, the language of algebra. In fact, only Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz eventually supplied the mathematics for the new science of nature. Its means of expression is the differential equation rather than Euclid's propositions.

old order of intelligibility is reversed. With the whole now to be explained by the parts, intelligibility means reducibility to that which, as elemental, is in the older sense least intelligible, because it least involves intelligence for its own performance. In a word, then, for the modern idea of understanding nature, the least intelligent has become the most intelligible, the least reasonable the most rational. At the bottom of all rationality or "mathematics" in nature's order lies the mere fact of there being quantitative constants in the behavior of matter, or the principle of uniformity as such, which found its first statement in the law of inertia—surely no mark of immanent reason.

It is obvious that the different sense in which nature can be spoken of as "mathematical" must necessarily affect the idea of a mathematical Creator. From what has been shown, Jeans' "Great Architect," for all his being a "pure mathematician," and even the God of Leibniz, for all his undeniable affiliation with the *Timaeus*,[7] cannot but be profoundly different from Plato's Demiurge. It may be taken for granted that a metaphysical point of view is not only the effect but also the cause of a scientific development. An event like the suppression of teleology and of substantial forms will not be put down simply to any particular discovery or set of discoveries made in the investigation of nature, nor even to the invention of a new method: rather has the revolution in method, for which the sudden obsolescence of these venerable concepts stands, itself to be accounted for. Indeed, certain metaphysical conditions were required even to make possible the new approach of post-Renaissance science to nature; and since we are dealing with the subject of creation, we may elucidate those conditions from this particular angle.

The God of the *Timaeus* created the world as the perfect animal or visible god, ensouled and intelligent. Looking to the intelligible pattern he formed the changeable in its likeness, and thus as far as possible in his own. For the intelligible and the intelligent are the same. Passive "matter" alone could certainly not be entrusted with preserving throughout change the forms and proportions imprinted on it, nor with providing the force for that motion of change itself, by which the fair copy must imitate eternity in time. Thus soul is required as the continually spontaneous cause of motion, and intelligence as the cause of rational motion, that is, one that exhibits law.

[7] Conclusively shown by Paul Schrecker in his paper, "Leibniz and the Timaeus," read at the 47th Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, at Toronto, December 1950.

It is this double aspect of "soul"—that it is the cause of motion and the cause of order—which makes it a universal physical principle. Soul pervades the cosmos in degrees of divinity, that is, of intelligence. The more consistently rational a motion, the higher must be the intelligence of the moving soul. Hence the superior intelligence of the celestial bodies, as compared to that of terrestrial beings, including man: hence the religious venerability of the Cosmos as a whole—not for its magnitude, but for the coincidence of intelligibility and intelligence that underlies its visible beauty.

Compare with this the Judaeo-Christian conception that took its place. The created world of Genesis is not a god and is not to be worshiped instead of God. Nor has it a soul of its own that accounts for its activity and its orderliness. It is merely made and in no sense maker. Jewish monotheism had abolished the deities of nature and all intermediary powers, leaving God and world in clean-cut division. The Christian hierarchy of angels and saints did not bridge the gulf between God and the world, but that between God and the human soul, which is itself not of the natural order, but shares their preternatural status. Indeed man's soul is the only entity in the world—but not of the world—which is created in the image of God, even out of God, and is thus in a sense divine, while heavens and earth and all their host are only His handiwork and not His image.[8] The essential division between God and world is thus repeated or mirrored in the essential division between mind and nature. Nature, created out of nothing, has no mind of her own, but mutely performs God's will by which alone she exists. Thus the idea of a mindless or "blind" nature, which yet behaves lawfully—that is, which keeps an intelligible order without being intelligent—had become metaphysically possible. The possibility depended on the condition that "soul" was banished from the context of nature, and this again was possi-

[8] That this religious distinction was realized in a sense conducive to natural science of the modern sort is shown in the following passage from Bacon: "The works of God . . . show the omnipotency and wisdom of the Maker, but not his image: and therefore therein the heathen opinion differeth from the sacred truth; for they supposed the world to be the image of God, and man to be an exact or compendious image of the world, but the Scriptures never vouchsafe to attribute to the world that honour, as to be the image of God, but only the work of His hands; neither do they speak of any other image of God, but man. . . ." *Works,* ed. Spedding and Ellis, III (London, 1857), 349 f. (quoted from Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes,* (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 91, n. 1, there quoted in support of the statement: "The division of philosophy into natural and human philosophy is based on the systematic distinction between man and the world, which Bacon makes in express controversy against ancient philosophy").

ble—if at all—only if and in so far as in the explanation of nature in general soul was not needed as the cause of motion. In fact, in a nature without mind, "soul" as a dynamic principle would be a source of irrationality and promote disorder rather than law. Now the abolition of nature-gods and divine powers by transcendental monotheism entirely favored this elimination of soul from the system of natural principles, and the same monotheism further worked toward the leveling of any inner-cosmic hierarchy of being by reducing all nature to the equal status of "creation"—equal before God: stars and dust, celestial and terrestrial nature alike. Once motion came to be conceived as an initial and self-conserving endowment of creation, requiring no further spontaneity on its own part, there could arise the conception of a nature not only mindless but also inanimate, that is, of a nature not only intelligible without being intelligent, but also moving without being alive.

The metaphysic of modern science seized on precisely this possibility, offered by Christian transcendentalism and held for so long in abeyance by the medieval alliance of church doctrine with Aristotelianism. It is true that the Renaissance philosophy of nature—the most "pagan" interlude in Western thought—attempted to combine the new vista of the universe with a pantheistic animism in the true classical style; but the seventeenth century, in its more sober and much more "Christian" mood—though certainly not from entirely Christian motives—reverted to the rigors of Judaeo-Christian transcendentalism—to extract from it the idea of a nature not spontaneous but strictly *subject* to law. In thus reaping the fruits of dualism, which throughout its long and varied career had tended to drain nature of her spiritual and vital attributes, the new metaphysic of science itself added the last chapter to this career by producing its own version of dualism. Its classical representative is Descartes' division of substance into *res cogitans* and *res extensa,* which—since "nature" is entirely and exclusively the latter, while the former is in no sense "nature"—provided the metaphysical charter for a purely mechanistic and quantitative picture of nature, with its corollary of mathematical method in physics. Here the character of dualism, and with it the status of mathematics, had irrevocably changed. For the classical polarity of form and matter, rational soul and body, intelligible and sensible, in which the second term of the unequally matched pairs, deficient in itself, requires the first for what being may be predicable of it, a new set of opposites was substituted, indicated by such terms as: subject-object, mind-thing, consciousness-spatiality, inwardness-outwardness, where the second term enjoys independent

—and finally even anterior—reality. The leading term for the spiritual is no longer "mind," but "ego" or "self," that for its object no longer "form," but "not-I." In this wholesale overthrow of Platonism, overlaid as it was at first by the rationalistic pathos of the Cartesian school, the fate of Western thought was decided. In essence, the repudiation consisted in the divorce of intellect from the intelligible, which involved the identification of "nature" with "matter," that is, with a matter that quite self-sufficiently exists on its own. This repeats the position of ancient atomism, but against a dualistic background which is alien to the classical precedent. Here the last and lethal metamorphosis of dualism is enacted, shortly to disintegrate into the equally barren alternatives of idealism and materialism: for the first time in its long history, every kind of awareness, however sensual or emotional—in short, irrational—is grouped with reason on one side, and set over against every kind of spatial being, including its mathematical, that is, rational, form, on the other side. "Matter" in fact, in the sense of "body," becomes more rational than "spirit."

Thus we have reached from the metaphysical end the same result, to which we were previously led by the analysis of method: namely, that the least intelligent has become the most, nay the only, intelligible. For though Descartes professes to have shown the mind to be "better [or "more easily"] known than the body,"[9] his own scientific method belies the claim where knowledge as a demonstrative system is concerned. The ease of knowledge in the case of the mind means only immediacy of self-beholding which, at the same time, leaves the beheld entirely unrelated to the total field of that knowable in which alone the method works, namely, the *res extensa*.[10] Since mind has retained no standing at all in the system of those rational objects which constitute Descartes' Nature, the object of science, there ensues the paradox that reason itself has become an irrational entity, intelligence entirely unintelligible within the intellectual scheme of the scientifically knowable: in other words, the knower himself is among his objects, that is, the world, the unknowable par excellence.

But we have seen that not only mind but also soul and therefore life have become redundant in the explanation of nature. Motion without soul involves force without appetition, from which forms result without being ends. The "force" is in every case inertial, that is, a quantitative constant carried over from instant to instant in an

[9] See his Second Meditation.

[10] "All things which, speaking generally, are comprehended in the object of pure mathematics are truly to be recognized as external objects." Observe the relation here stipulated between "mathematical" and "external"!

endless series. Now, since life means spontaneous and teleological motion, while understanding is in terms of inertial motion alone, there follows the further paradox that not only the mindless but also the lifeless has become the intelligible as such, and "dead matter" the standard of intelligibility. But inasmuch as "life" is encountered as a fact within the totality of physical facts, its understanding must mean precisely its reduction to this standard, that is, its explanation in terms of the lifeless. Descartes' mechanistic theory of the organism, the animal automaton (the exemption of man was a mere inconsistency), is therefore a logical and unavoidable consequence from his whole metaphysical and epistemological principle which set the stage for modern science beyond its own brief historical hour. La Mettrie's *L'homme machine* (no less than modern behaviorism) is still heir to a Cartesian dualism which has only recently let go of its spiritual side. And since modern science, as quantitative and measuring, continues to be enacted on the stage on which it was ushered in, the stage of a nature essentially understood as *res extensa* or "external reality," no other cognition of the organic is available to it than one in terms of the mindless and the lifeless; and this must be represented as a system of minimum quantities in space and time, the resolution into which constitutes the understanding of any given entity.

I have tried to show what the idea of a mathematical nature means in the modern context, and what is therefore asserted, though probably not to his own knowledge, in Jeans' statement that the architect of the universe is a pure mathematician. We are now sufficiently prepared to ask: *Is* God a pure mathematician?—that is, in the only sense which the assertion can have in the given scientific situation. To answer this question we shall try to look at creation through the eyes of the mathematical God and find out what objects he would, and what he would not apprehend: what objects, therefore (since his thought is said to be the cause of things), he could have, and what objects he could not have, created.[11]

What the objectivity of the divine mathematician would likely be we may gather, for example, from the writings of Eddington, if not from the older picture drawn by Laplace. Eddington's vivid descriptions of the shadow world of mathematical values, into which the

[11] In performing this test—it might be objected—we have to consider the present state of science, whose limitations would not bind the cognitive powers of God. But the problem lies not where science falls short of its program, but rather in the anticipated fulfillment of that program. That is, not any "dated" incompleteness of its results but their ideally imagined completeness within the conceptual framework of science as such has to be confronted with the ontological facts of organic existence. And this can be done by extrapolation from the present state in the direction indicated by it.

solid objects of our experience dissolve, we take as sufficiently well known not to require elaboration. And since loss in color need not be loss in truth, we will grant the possibility that this object picture, replacing familiar entities by systems of quantitative relations between widely spaced nodal points of reality, may with all its lack of color and concreteness be the truer one. But suppose it is a living body, an organism, on which the gaze of the divine mathematician happens to rest. It may be unicellular or multicellular. What would the God of the physicists "see"? As a physical body the organism will exhibit the same general features as other aggregates. But special goings–on will be discernible both inside and outside which will render its phenomenal unity still more problematical than that of ordinary bodies, and will efface almost entirely its material identity through time. I refer to its *metabolism,* its exchange of matter with the surroundings. In this process of being, the material parts of which the organism consists at a given instant are only temporary, passing contents whose material identity does not coincide with the identity of the whole which they enter and leave and which sustains its own identity by the very act of passage of foreign matter through its spatial system, its living form. It is never the same materially and yet persists as its same self, *by* not remaining the same matter. Once it really becomes the same with the sameness of its material contents—if any two "time slices" of it become, as to their individual contents, identical with each other and with the slices between them—it ceases to live; it dies.[12]

At first glance, this is suggestive of a type of object with which physics is not unfamiliar. Mathematical description does deal with dynamic *wholes* enjoying an identity of their own in time different from that of their changing constituents. I think that perhaps the wave (in a material medium such as water or air) provided the first model for such descriptive entities of a mediate order. The oscillating units, of which it successively consists in its progress, perform their movements singly, each participating only momentarily in the constitution of the individual "wave": yet this as the comprehensive form of the propagated disturbance has its own distinct unity, its own history, and its own laws, and these can become independent objects of mathematical analysis, in abstraction from the more immediate identities of the substratum. Modern physics deals largely with such whole-structures of happening, and special modes of the differential calculus are applied to their description. Here, then, form re-enters

[12] Or becomes dormant as do certain seeds and spores whose life process stops, to be resumed under appropriate conditions.

the physical scene with a cognitive significance of its own. And this transcending form, an event-structure, is of a different order from that of a crystal-structure where the form is inseparably allied to the persistence of the material. But it must be noted, with a view to the following considerations, that to these integrated event-structures no special reality is accorded that is not contained in, and deducible from, the conjoint reality of the participating, more elementary events: hypothetically the latter must completely account for every character of the former, or there must be strict equivalence (as expressed in an equation, which means that there is no novelty in the whole as such); and to an infinite intelligence the simultaneous realization of all the individual components would still be the perfect knowledge.

Reverting to the organism, we find there a whole-structure whose modes of formal wholeness and of transcending identity in process resemble in some respects those of the physical event-structures just referred to. And an adequate quantitative description in those terms can be imagined as a possibility of the supreme mathematician. But this must result, by the very nature of mathematics, in a perfect equation between the elementary constituents and the constituted "whole," with no surplus remaining on the side of the latter which would be attributable only to the nature of the whole as such. Indeed the absence of any such remainder is a test of success for this analysis. Now this means nothing but that the analysis of the Great Mathematician, even when applied to the organic complex as a whole, must in the last resort fasten on the transient elements ("transient" from the standpoint of the whole), which alone provide the immediate identity for the mechanical construction of the complex and alone remain as the residue of its analysis. The life process will then present itself as a series of happenings concerning these single persisting units of general substance, which for individual causal reasons move through certain configurations: the particular configuration under view which we call organism has no bearing on their single identity nor on their mode of function, and is in principle no different from any other configuration which they may enter and temporarily help to constitute. No other causality is involved inside it than that obtaining outside, and the transient particle continues in its proper concatenation of cause and effect when entering, when inside, and when leaving it. That its place is taken by a successor is a new fact whose repetition adds up to a continuity of aggregate form, but does not affect the singleness of each happening. Thus there is no reason to posit a special entity for that particular form of together-

ness with its normal set of interactions. Against the flow of the momentary constituent parts, the configurative permanence by replacement—and thus the continuity of the "whole"—is an abstraction. To illustrate once more by the example of the wave: strictly speaking, not its progress as a moving form causes the successive entering of new units into the collective motion of which it consists, but the transmission of individual motion among adjoining elementary units adds up to the integrated whole-form which progresses on their account. In the same light the organism must appear as a function of metabolism and not vice versa. Every happening involved, and consequently their sum total at each instant, can be—or must be—accurately accounted for on the lines of the general scheme underlying the mathematical world-picture: on the lines of teleological indifference, exclusiveness of mechanical *causa efficiens,* that is, causal dominance of the past, inertial uniformity, smallest particle, quantitative extensity, and so on. In such an ideal analysis the apparent sameness and individuality of the organic whole will be even more thoroughly resolved as an incidental result into the total system of the physical universe than that of an ordinary complex body; and all the features of a self-related autonomous entity would, in the end, appear as purely phenomenal, that is, fictitious.

Here again we should say that the object-view of the divine mathematician would be less bodily and less colorful than our own—but would we also grant it, as before, the possibility of being truer? Emphatically not in this case, and here we move on firm ground, because here, being living bodies ourselves, we happen to have inside knowledge. On the strength of the immediate cognitive deliverance of our bodies *we* are able to say what disembodied onlookers would have no warrant for saying: that the mathematical God in his homogeneous analytical view would miss the decisive point—the point of life itself: its being self-centered individuality, being for itself and in contraposition to all the rest of the world, with an essential boundary dividing "inside" and "outside"—on the basis of the actual exchange. It may be true in the case of every other form of togetherness of a multiplicity (though I do not think so) that its distinct unity as a whole is nothing but the product of an onlooker's synthesis, for example, of the unconsciously synthesizing mass-integration by our senses, and thus its individual wholeness is not of an ontological but of a phenomenological character. But then, in the case of life, nature springs an ontological surprise in which the world-accident of terrestrial existence reveals a radically new possibility of being: complex units of matter which are unities of the multiple not in virtue of a

synthesizing perception whose object they happen to be but in virtue of themselves and to themselves, continually sustained by themselves and for the sake of themselves. Here wholeness is self-integrating in active performance, form being for once not the result but the cause of the material assemblies in which it successively subsists. Unity here is self-unifying, by means of changing multiplicity. Sameness, while it lasts (and it does not last inertially in the manner of static identity or of onmoving continuity), is perpetual self-renewal through process, borne on the shift of otherness. This active self-integration of life alone yields the *ontological* concept of an *individual* as against the merely phenomenological one.

This ontological individual, its very existence at any moment, its duration and its identity in duration is, then, essentially its own function, its own concern, its own continuous achievement. In the process of self-sustained being, the relation of the organism to its material substance is of a double nature: the materials are essential to it specifically, accidental individually; it coincides with their actual togetherness at the instant, but is not bound to any one togetherness in the succession of instants, only to their form of togetherness which it is itself; it is dependent on their availability as materials, independent of their sameness as these; its own functional identity does not coincide with their substantial identity. In a word, the organic form stands in a dialectical relation of *needful freedom* to matter.

Let us consider further this new element of *freedom* which appears in organism, with special reference to *form*. Form, we saw, is an essential and a real, that is, efficacious, characteristic of life. Only with life emerges, as a concrete reality, the difference of matter and form which in respect to lifeless things is but an abstract distinction. And the ontological relationship is reversed: form becomes the essence, matter the accident. In the realm of the lifeless, form is but a changing composite state, an accident, of enduring matter. And viewed from the fixed identity of the momentary material contents, the living form too is only a region of local and temporal transit in their own movements, its apparent unity a passing, configurative state of their multiplicity. But viewed from the dynamic identity of the living form, the reverse holds: the changing material contents are states of its enduring identity, their multiplicity marking the extent of its effective unity. In fact, instead of saying that the living form is a region of transit for matter, it would be truer to say that the material contents in their succession are phases of transit for the self-continuation of the form. Yet, it will be asked, what can it mean that one view

is truer than the other if both are possible, that is, equivalent as descriptions of the facts from different aspects? And if they are, why should the physical world-picture, satisfied in the one view, be disturbed or questioned by the other? We shall take up this question later.

The basic freedom of organism we found to consist in a certain independence of form with respect to its own matter. According to a strictly material world-account such independence is either an absurdity or deceptive in appearance. Its emergence with emerging life indeed marks an ontological revolution in the history of matter; and the development and enhancement of that independence, or freedom, is the principle of progress in the evolution of life, which in its course produces new revolutions—each an additional step in the initial direction, that is, the opening of a new horizon of freedom. The first step was the emancipation of form, by means of metabolism, from the immediate identity with matter. This also means emancipation from the type of fixed self-identity that is matter's, to make room for a different, mediate, and functional kind of identity.

The material particle, identifiable in its space-time position, is simply what it is, immediately identical with itself without need to maintain that self-identity as an act of its existence. Its duration is mere remaining, and in remaining it is successively "identical" by reason of the continuity of the dimensions—space and time—in which its sequence takes place. It is this one and not that one, because this is now here and that now there; it remains this, that is, is the same at a different (later) point of space-time, because from its present to its new position there leads the continuous sequence of all intermediate positions which, as it were, hand it on from one to the next without ever letting it outside their bond. Such sequence constitutes the "path" of the unit, and if it were discontinuous we should have no means of identification, and no warrant even for applying the concept of identity; and there would be none—unless there were an inwardness also supplying its own continuity. Thus in physical terms there is only this external principle of an identity bestowed on units by the *principia individuationis* (space and time); or equivalently: by the totality of the physical universe defining their place. Of an internal principle of identity in physical particles we do not know (though there may be one).

Organic identity, however, is of a different nature. In the precarious metabolic continuity of organic form, with its perpetual turnover of constituents, no "bundle" of parallel paths of contemporaneous members would be available to deputize for an internal

principle of identity. Such internal identity of the whole, transcending the collective one of the present substratum, is implicit in the adventure of form and has to be assumed on the external morphological evidence, supplementing it, though not analytically deducible from it. In fact, organic existence as its own experience is required on the part of the observer himself to enable him to make that inference, which he does make all the time, and this is the advantage—perennially disowned or slandered in the history of epistemology—of his "having," that is, being, a body. It is by this interpolation of an internal identity alone that the mere morphological (and as such incomprehensible) fact—metabolic continuity—is comprehended as an incessant act, that is, continuity is comprehended as self-continuation. The introduction of the term "self," unavoidable in any description of the most elementary instance of life, indicates the emergence, with life as such, of internal identity—and so, as one with that emergence, its self-isolation too from all the rest of reality. Profound singleness and heterogeneousness within a universe of homogeneously interrelated existence mark the selfness of organism. An identity which from moment to moment reasserts itself, achieves itself, and defies the equalizing forces of physical sameness all around, is truly pitted against the rest of things. In the hazardous polarization thus ventured upon by emerging life, that which is not itself and borders on the realm of internal identity from without assumes at once the character of absolute otherness. The challenge of selfness qualifies all this beyond the boundaries of the organism as foreign and somehow opposite: as "world," in which, by which, and against which, it is committed to maintain itself. Without this universal counterpart of otherness, there would be no selfness. And in this polarity of self and world, of internal and external, complementing that of form and matter, the basic situation of freedom with all its daring and distress is potentially complete.

It is the task of a philosophical biology—such as these considerations are intended to suggest as an urgent desideratum of ontology—to develop the implications of this germinal freedom in the progressive wealth of its structures throughout organic evolution. For our present purpose, few remarks are needed to indicate some of these implications. The first refers to what we may call the thoroughly "dialectical" nature of organic freedom, namely, that it is balanced by correlative necessity, created by itself and entirely peculiar to itself and to each stage in its advance to higher degrees of independence. This double aspect is already there in what we found to be the primary

mode of organic freedom—metabolism as such: denoting, on the side of freedom, a capacity of organic form, namely to change its matter, it denotes equivalently the irremissible necessity for it to do so. Its "can" is a "must," since its execution is identical with its being. It can, but it cannot cease to do what it can without ceasing to be. Thus the sovereignty of form with respect to its matter is also its subjection to the need of it, by its impossibility to rest with any concretion attained, that is, with any simultaneous sum of stuff with which it coincides in an instant of time. This indigence of life is no less unique a distinction of it within the world of matter than is its power, of which it is but the other side: its liberty itself is its peculiar necessity. That is the antinomy of freedom at the roots of life and in its most elementary form, that of metabolism.

A second observation immediately follows: in order to change matter, the living form must have matter at its disposal and this it finds outside itself, in the foreign "world." Thereby life is turned towards the world in a particular relatedness of dependence and possibility. Its want goes out to where its means of satisfaction lie: its self-concernedness, active in the acquisition of new matter, is essential openness for the encounter of outer actuality. Thus "world" is there from the earliest beginning, and the basic setting for experience—a horizon thrown open by the mere transcendence of want which widens the seclusion of internal identity into a correlative circumference of vital relationship. It is important to see that this self-transcendence, opening into an environment, is grounded in the fundamental transcendence of organic form relative to its matter, which constitutionally refers it beyond its given material composition to foreign matter as needed and potentially its own. In other words, the self-transcendence of life in having a world, with all its promise of higher and more comprehensive stages, springs from the primary antinomy of freedom and necessity inherent in organism as such.

Third, there is inwardness or subjectivity involved in this transcendence and in each of the relations centrifugally or centripetally actualized in its horizon. This much the concept of an "internal identity" already implies. Whether we call this inwardness feeling, irritability and reactivity to stimulus, appetition, or nisus, in even an infinitesimal degree of awareness it harbors the supreme concernedness of organism with its own being and continuation of being (that is, it is self-centered), and at the same time bridges the qualitative gulf to the rest of being by selective modes of relatedness which, with their urgency and specificness, replace the general integration of material objects in their physical context. This repeats in essence

what was said about the self-transcendence of life, only with the emphasis now on the element of inwardness. In affection by a foreign body, the affected feels itself, its selfness excited, or, as it were, illuminated, against the otherness without, and thus set off in its isolation. At the same time, beyond the inner state of excitation and "through" it, the presence of the affecting is felt, its message as that of otherness, however obscurely, incorporated within. So, in facing outward, internal identity becomes the subject-pole of a communication with things more intimate than that between physical units, and so the very opposite of isolation emerges from the isolation of the organic self. Here again we meet the dialectical structure pervading all ontological characters of life which can only be grasped as a paradox of material existence. We may add that, in higher forms, *memory* specifically represents the internal identity of organic being in its continuity, which thus gains an articulate inwardness of its own; but the identity itself is more fundamental than memory and consciousness, being inherent in the integrative form-continuity as such and involving inwardness from the very beginnings of organism.

The mention of memory prompts one last remark. By the transcendence of life we mean its entertaining a horizon, or horizons, beyond its point-identity. So far the horizon of environment with the presence of things has been considered, or the extension of relatedness into simultaneous space. But self-concernedness actuated by want throws open as well a horizon of time embracing, not outer presence, but inner imminence: the imminence of that future into which organic continuity is each moment about to extend by the satisfaction of that moment's want. Thus life is facing forward as well as outward and is "beyond" its own immediacy in both horizons at once. In fact it faces outward only because, by the necessity of its freedom, it faces forward, so that spatial presence is lighted up, as it were, by temporal imminence and both merge into past fulfillment (or its negative, disappointment). It follows that, in the internal horizon extended by the self-transcendence of the organic "now" into the process of its continuity, the anticipation of imminent future in appetition is more fundamental than the retention of past in memory. It also follows that within organism the external linear time-pattern of antecedent and sequent, involving the causal dominance of the past, is inadequate: while mere externality is, or presents itself, wholly determined by what it was, life is essentially also what it is going to be and just becoming: in its case, the extensive order of past and future is intensively reversed. This is the root of the teleological or finalistic nature of life: finalism is in the first place a

dynamic character of a certain mode of existence, coincident with the freedom and identity of form towards matter, and in the second place a fact of structure or organization, as exemplified in the relation of organic parts to the whole and in the fitness of organism generally. With this Aristotelian reminder we may return from analysis to discussion.

None of the features expounded in the last two sections has a place in mathematical description of physical entities; and the organism undeniably is a physical entity and thus subject matter for such uniform description in extensive, spatiotemporal terms. Externally its organization presents itself as a pattern *in extenso,* and its functioning as the exceedingly subtle mechanics of this pattern: the physicochemical analysis of life aims at the complete unraveling of both, which must amount to their complete subsumption as a special case under the general laws of physical patterns. This is because "unraveling" means reduction to the elementary, which is "inorganic," that is, lifeless, and general, that is identical throughout nature—so that the scientific understanding of life comes to mean its conceptual assimilation to that which is not life. In the fullness of success this would result in the disappearance of life as such, coincident with the explanation of all its outward phenomena—except for the fact that the scientific undertaking itself is an act of life, and the scientist a living being, and thus by original experience of life saved from forgetting that there is "something else" to it. But if we credit the mathematical God with the fullness of that which human science has not yet attained, without the benefit of sharing in organic existence himself, then to him, while the extensive pattern will furnish all the data for its own explanation, life itself would not even become visible, nor yet a blank in its place. For, taken by themselves (as was pointed out above), the material elements satisfy, in this precisely as in any other role, all the requirements of the mathematical-mechanical scheme and of its modes of explanation or description: particles are drawn into and pass through certain configurations, enter certain combinations, execute certain locomotions—pass out again into other fields of relations. To the outside, or extensive, aspect there is nothing else to it. The greater complexity of such a system is no essentially new feature. True, it is a physically improbable system, but the improbable, when it happens, is just as necessary as the most probable case. And with the divine mathematician, for whom the whole difference of probability and improbability is resolved into the one identical necessity, the unitary description in

terms of that necessity alone would be ideally complete, and to the same degree exclusive: not only would it cover all the facts, as facts go for this object-pattern, it would also in its closeness leave no room for slipping in an additional heterogeneous principle. In other words: the divine mathematician, being the ideal physicist with complete possession of all outer data and perfect power of analysis, would account on his lines as exhaustively for this phenomenon as for any other in the physical universe; he would be neither in need nor in command of any other aspect; there would be nothing lacking within that context and he would miss nothing.

Yet, we know that this is not the whole truth because of what science likes to call "subjective" evidence. This can be dismissed as irrelevant for the exposition of physical objectivity on either of the following two counts: either that the phenomena of "subjectivity" constitute an entirely separate field which, whatever its metaphysical standing, does not reach beyond itself (for example, in interaction) and is thus as if it were nonexistent in the system of natural causes and effects; or that they stand in a relation of unilateral dependence to this system and can therefore at best lay claim to a derivative and secondary reality, to be explained by the primary one, but itself redundant in any immanent account of it. The first of these alternatives represents dualism of the Cartesian kind, the second "epiphenomenalism," that is, the materialist assertion that mind, or awareness generally, is only a powerless "epiphenomenon" or byplay of physical happenings which follow their own rules entirely. Of these two, the materialistic alternative is easily disposed of since, denying the autonomy of thinking, it invalidates thought and thus itself as a rational whole of thought (that is, an argument claiming truth on the merits of its reasons and not on the merit of its factual happening). The dualistic alternative, however, being logically consistent in itself, must be judged by recourse to the facts, of which "organism" is a crucial one.

But first let us take one glance at the quasi-monistic position of subjective idealism, the possible counterpart of materialism, in which somehow the ego is substituted for God. This position grants one unique subjectivity (my own) with its horizon of inwardness, and presents therein an outward objectivity which in its primary aspect, as befits "outwardness," is purely extensional, that is, physical, objectivity: and were it not for one particular part of this outwardness being presented in the peculiar mode of "mine-ness"—namely, my body—and similar shapes to this one being found among the external

objects, there would be no reason at all, and no inducement, for any analogical imputation of inwardness to parts of externality whose own evidence as external, that is, spatial, cannot suggest such an interpretation. Now this is exactly the situation of Jeans' hypothetical God who is pure theoretical subjectivity, with no body of his own among the extensional objectivity embraced by him: his is therefore a purely physical or dead objectivity which as such may well be entirely mathematical. But since there *are* "egos," which must also be creatures, and therefore objects of apprehension, of God, and yet are certainly not mathematical objects, we must in fairness to Jeans interpret his dictum as meaning that it is as architect of the *material* universe that God is a pure mathematician—leaving open in what capacity he is the creator and beholder of units of feeling and beholding. Thus the dualistic assumption is carried, as a necessary corollary, right into the heart of Jeans' hypothesis: we may, then, try to picture how under this dichotomy creation would be beheld by the omniscience of God.[13]

God in his creative knowledge would behold, besides the dead world of extended objectivity, a multiple host of individualized subjectivity, like unto his own, but of many shades of obscurity and clarity—each with a correspondingly shaded phenomenal objectivity, which coincides with a section of his own, but is presented in a particular, occasionally shifting, perspective from within that objectivity; and each with one region at the center of that perspective distinguished as belonging to itself as its "body": this phenomenal region in each case *happening to coincide* with some actual material system *of peculiar arrangement* within real extensity. These systems are what we call organisms and living (but they are part of the dead), either by reason of their peculiar physical arrangement, or (the choice is ours) by reason of their coincidence with the phenomenal "mine"-region of a subjectivity, which thus, though itself nonspatial, seems localized in them. Either-or, coincidence, and happening are all that the premises warrant saying, and this leaves open, in these particular cases, two parallel ways of describing what is locally the same event: either in terms of outwardness or in terms of inwardness, neither description interfering with the other and neither requisite for the

[13] We have, of course, to adopt a strictly noninteractive version of dualism, such as was designed, in the diverse forms of psychophysical parallelism, with the specific purpose of safeguarding for science the homogeneity and closed character of the material realm.

internal completeness of the other; that is, more specifically for our case, no terms of the inward description being requisite for the completeness of the outward description.

Now if this construction, however artificial, proves tenable in the face of the facts, we will grant Jeans' contention with the sole qualification, mentioned above, that it is the "architect of the *material* universe" who appears as a pure mathematician. But it is just in the face of organism that the dualistic construction does break down. Far from there being just a coincidence of inwardness with some indifferent parts of extensity which simply happen to serve as the center-regions of a phenomenal objectivity, these particular parts—organisms—are obviously *organized for* inwardness, for internal identity, for individuality—and less obviously perhaps from them as well. True, this is obvious only to a mind enjoying organic existence itself, or to a corporeal subject, and is entirely outside the grasp of bodyless intellect, if its immediate objectivity, as ours, is only of the *res extensa*. But if, on the premises of the experiment, the external facts of organism are contained without a remainder in the total account of divine mathematics, at the cost of their not being recognizable *as* facts pertaining to organism, this perfectly agreeing account would not betoken the self-sufficiency of the spatial on its exclusive terms, but the deficiency of a merely extensive description of it. For (with apologies for the truism) eyes do have in their physical make-up a reference to seeing, and ears to hearing, and organs generally to their performance—and, more generally still, organisms to living. This is not just an additional aspect of them, or an optional mode of interpretation: it is their own teleological nature. However complete may be the physicochemical analysis of the composition of the eye and of the processes attending its stimulation, no physiological account of its construction and functioning can be given without relating it to seeing. And what is plain in so highly specialized a case is true in principle for the whole class of material things we call organisms, though it tends to become more easily disregarded, for purposes of physical description, on the lower rungs of the ladder of life-forms, that is, with decreasing complexity of organization and decreasing differentiation of function (and probably corresponding decrease of awareness). But there is always the finality of organism as such, and its concern in living: effective already in all vegetative tendency, awakening to awareness in the dim reflexes, responding irritability of lowly organisms; more so in urge and effort and anguish of animal life endowed with motility and sense-organs; reaching self-

transparency in consciousness, will and thought of man: all these being inward aspects of the teleological side in the nature of "matter." How this finalism tallies, in the same world, with mechanical causality whose reality cannot be denied either is a problem not to be "solved" by sacrificing an evidence (purposiveness) to a theorem (exclusiveness of *causa efficiens*) derived by generalization from another evidence; but if solvable at all, only by treating it as the profoundly challenging and as yet completely unsettled problem it is. At all events, the teleological structure and behavior of organism is not just an alternative choice of description: it is, on the evidence of each one's own organic awareness, the external manifestation of the inwardness of substance. To add the implications: there is no organism without teleology; there is no teleology without inwardness; and: life can be known only by life.

This is the advantage we poor mortals have over Jeans' mathematical God: happening to be living material things ourselves, we have in our self-experience, as it were, peepholes into the inwardness of substance, thereby having an idea (or the possibility of having an idea) not only of how reality is spread and interacts in extensity, but of how it *is* to *be* real and to act and to be acted upon. And we can still contrive, by certain acts of abstraction, to be also mathematicians and mathematical physicists.

We begin to suspect that the "material" which the Great Mathematician had to use for embodying his ideas had an intrinsic nature of its own, unknown to him and unprovided for in his scheme—properties which found their opportunity within the mechanical evolution to realize, in the seeming automatism of causal sequence, some of the hidden potentialities of original substance: of which realization we are instances. Thus betrayed into constructing a manifold with a tendency of its own, what the mathematician creates he knoweth not. For him eyes do not see, and ears do not hear. He resembles much more the Demiurge of the Gnostics, who creates the world in ignorance of what he lets himself in for, than the Demiurge of Plato who creates the world out of knowledge.

The end of our inquiry is only the threshold of much larger tasks, which, I believe, are more than ever imposed on philosophy. They are: a philosophical biology without which there cannot be a philosophical anthropology on the one hand and a philosophy of nature on the other; and a new examination of *causa* without which these three cannot be brought into line. But with regard to the immediate issue of this essay I trust that the foregoing suffices to show why I

conclude "from the intrinsic evidence of his creation" that the Creator must be different from what the metaphysician Jeans thinks him to be—to the same extent that creation, that is, being, is different from what the mathematical physicist Jeans conceives it to be. Therefore, our final answer to the question, "Is God a Mathematician?"—meaning essentially and purely a mathematician, even with respect to the *material* universe alone—is a distinct "No."

FISHING AT NIGHT

Henry Rago

Gone out from Praiano, after six weeks
Of the same card-game, the small men with the
Gigantic oaths, and weather-rhymes that make
More truth with a guitar than with the sea.
They were awash with white wine just today;
They slammed their cards and made towering speeches
Charging and countercharging cuckoldry.
Leisure they know best of the ancestral teaching.

Now we can see only their lanterns; each
Light is a boat, compass of a dim tenure
Drawn in the three dimensions of the dark
On the oldest of seas. The Saracens
Would come in a great sweep of ships, hundreds
Of slaves lashed to the oars. The Corinthian fleets
Compelled the sea-god to this coast with a temple
Challenging Athens. Remnants on this beach—

And these men in the gesture of beseeching
Older than their half-shadowed memory
And past the echoes of their speech, dredging
Again this night for what is left them. These,
That lisp the ancient syllables and blur
The sense, know the penumbra of the sea's
Age. They venture tonight near the dark core.
The sea will give them what their nets can reach.

THE ORIGINS OF ROMANCE LITERATURE IN THE LIGHT OF A RECENT DISCOVERY

Ramón Menéndez-Pidal

CONFLICTING THEORIES

There are two conflicting theories concerning the origin of the literature of the peoples of Romance language—or rather, concerning the origin of poetry, since poetry always precedes the development of prose.

According to the first theory, which I shall call "individualist," poetry in the Romance languages was created by those authors who wrote the oldest texts now in existence. There did exist earlier, though not much earlier, other texts which are now lost, but these are without significance and one cannot speak of them as historical antecedents, since every work of art is born within the individual genius who creates it and concludes its history with him. There is, according to this view, no such thing as literary species except in the minds of learned writers. There are no species with an independent existence of their own—which would be incomplete unless we presuppose the existence of lost texts. There are only the works of this or that individual poet, each possessing an autonomous life of its own. It can well be said that French literature began in the eleventh century with the *Chanson de Roland,* that Spanish literature arose in the twelfth with the *Poema del Cid,* and that in Italy there was no poetry of any kind until the thirteenth century. Those distinct individuals who wrote the earliest works in the vernacular that have been preserved set out on an untrodden path, inspired by the works in ancient or medieval Latin which they continued or imitated. Therefore, we can and must establish literary history upon tangible realities; it is unnecessary to resort to hypotheses since all of them lack solid foundation.

In opposition, the "traditionalist" theory holds that the origins of Romance literature go back much farther than the texts which exist today, and that these cannot be explained unless we take into account a long tradition of lost texts which have slowly shaped the form and substance of the various literary species. Within these species, even the most gifted individual could not have written, guided solely by his own genius, had he not been influenced and limited by the cultural tradition which had formed him and which he served. The most impetuous and turbulent river still flows within the borders it cannot leave. According to this theory—as may be expected—it is a pure illusion for those who affirm a late origin to believe that they themselves do not rely on hypotheses but on tangible facts. Some hypothesis is always necessary as without it we could form only an insipid agnosticism which would have the history of Romance poetry begin with the oldest preserved texts—forbidding us even to think of anything more ancient, be it to affirm or to deny its existence. Human intelligence will not resign itself here, however, since disturbing related problems are left unsolved. And if, on behalf of the individualist theory its most learned, talented, and brilliant champion, Joseph Bédier, maintains that the French epic was born in the eleventh century and not earlier, or, while invoking the authority of Bédier, Silvio Pellegrini affirms that Spanish poetry was born in the thirteenth century or at the end of the twelfth century and not earlier, they establish a most positivistic theory, while we, as hypothetically as they, affirm a long preceding tradition. The question is: which of the two hypotheses is better founded, which supplies a better explanation of known facts, and which receives more support from actual discoveries?

I cannot enter here into the lengthy arguments which I have set forth in earlier studies in 1920 and 1943. In these, in support of the traditionalist theory, I mentioned the testimony of three chronicles written during the first half of the twelfth century which repeatedly refer to group songs used by the citizens of Santiago in 1110, of Sahagun in 1116, of Zaragoza in 1134, and of Toledo in 1139 to receive kings and other personalities entering those cities. The same chronicles mention other songs with which the Toledan soldiers of the emperor Alfonso VII celebrated their victories of 1134 and 1143 over the Moslems, and also the funeral lamentations chanted by the Toledan widows at the entombment of those who died in battle. On the basis of these numerous notices, I was able to confirm the fact that several years before the composition of the *Poema del Cid* (c. 1140), which is almost always adduced as the earliest work of

Spanish literature, lyrical poetry had already come into being in the kingdom of Castilla and León as an expression of the emotional experiences of human existence. This made it necessary to recognize that in the origins of Spanish literature there had once been a lively poetical production which is now lost.

In addition to the testimony of Christian chronicles, we have the words of certain Arab writers about a Cordoban poet of the late ninth century who imitated songs of the Christians living under Moslem domination, the so-called *Mozárabes*. From this we may conclude that the Christians of Andalusia also had their own songs several centuries older than the Galician-Portuguese *cancioneros*.

These findings were intolerable to the school that denied tradition, and were rejected by many learned critics who were unanimous in qualifying both of them as simply hypothetical. But to reject them they had to pass over in silence the testimony of the Christian chronicles as well as of the Moslem writers—testimony that is a fact just as tangible as the songs of the ninth century or the beginning of the twelfth had they been preserved. Having discarded and overlooked these dates, our opponents cling to the position that no poetical text originating prior to the thirteenth century exists and that therefore it is safest to take into account only those literary works that have been preserved.

THE MUWASHSHAHA AND THE ZAJAL

The Moslem testimony just mentioned deserves special attention. Through the works of the famous Spanish Arabist, J. Ribera, elaborated by the Czech Arabist and Romanist, A. R. Nykl, as well as through the work of the Egyptian Abdalaziz Al-Ahwani, the Spanish professor E. García Gomez, and others, we know the testimony of two Arab authors of the twelfth century, Ibn Bassam and Al-Hijari. According to their writings, a well-known poet called Mucaddam (a native of Cabra, south of Córdoba) invented a new kind of poetry, the *Muwashshaha,* which broke the forms of the classical Arabic meter and violated the purity of style by admitting in its last stanza verses in the vulgar Arabic tongue and in the Romance language of the Christians. This poet innovator flourished under the Emir Abdallah of Córdoba (888–912).

It was to be hoped that these versicles in the vulgar Arabic tongue at the end of a composition might have preserved for us some sample of the songs of the *Mozárabes* of Andalusia. But among the many *Muwashshahas* published, although there were several with final

verses in the Arabic vulgate, there were found none in Spanish. The philologists, anxious to discover in these Arabic poems rhymes in the Mozarab language, had to be contented with another form of Hispano-Arabic poetry, the *Zajal*—a kind of *Muwashshaha* without vernacular end verses but with popular and Romance forms in some of the other verses. This was studied in the only usable large collection of *Zajals,* that of Ibn Cuzman, a Cordoban poet who died in 1160. His eighty-second *Zajal* must be mentioned here since it contains not only single Romantic words or phrases, but an entire verse which sings the dawn of early light: *alba, alba es de luz en nueva dia,* a verse which without doubt belongs to a Mozarab *Albada.* Thus we see that the literary species of the *Albada* was popular among the Christians of Andalusia half a century before the first existing Provençal *Albadas* were written at the end of the twelfth century. These Provençal *Albadas,* unlike those of northern France, always retain in their refrains the term *alba*—aurora—alluding to the coming of the new day; this word also appears and is repeated three times in the *Albada* attributed without foundation to Rimbaut de Vaqueiras (end of the twelfth century): *L'alba, l'alba, oc l'alba!*—and much earlier *alba alba!*—was also chanted in Córdoba. Here we grasp another very tangible fact which has failed to attract the attention of the school that denies the existence of any Spanish poetry prior to the thirteenth century—that is, in the *Zajal 82* of Ibn Cuzman we hear an evocative verse from one of the several popular songs mentioned in the chronicles of the first half of the twelfth century, but of which no example has been preserved. A single lyrical verse—but one bud is sufficient proof. And good proof it is, since this verse reveals to us the existence of a poetical species—the *Albada*—which those chronicles have not attested.

DISCOVERY OF THE ROMANCE MUWASHSHAHAS

The hope of finding Mozarab chants had been abandoned when, in 1948, Professor S. M. Stern announced the discovery of twenty Hebrew *Muwashshahas,* all of which imitated Arabic *Muwashshahas* and were provided with final verses in very archaic Spanish. A little later the same scholar published an Arabic *Muwashshaha* with Romance ending, and at present Sr. García Gómez is studying another series of Arabic texts of the same class. A wide horizon thus opened up. A new day dawned for the entire field of philological investigation, from the literary as well as from the linguistic point of view.

The obstacles which have so much retarded the knowledge of this strange treasure of Spanish primivitism are obvious enough. The *Muwashshahas* ending with Romance verses spread with greater difficulty than those concluding with verses in the Arabic vulgate, or those writings that were altogether in the classical language; the non-Spanish copyists refused to copy them, or if they did, they omitted the Spanish verses. Moreover, this kind of poetry, one part of which was so shockingly popular, was held in little esteem. Curiously enough, a large part of the manuscripts which today serve to make known the *Muwashshahas* of the great Hebrew poets—with the verselets which are so precious for the rest of us—can be traced to the *Gueniza,* or storeroom, of the ancient synagogue of Fostat, the ancient Cairo. The dry climate of Egypt, which has helped to preserve so many Greek and Latin papyri, has also preserved the damaged folios and torn sheets which were piled up in that place in the course of centuries. Of the verses discovered, there is hardly one that does not depend, for its reading, upon some manuscript taken from that storeroom of the old Egyptian synagogue.

The earliest author of the poems that interest us here is Yosef the Scribe, of the first half of the eleventh century. Next, there are the two greatest Hebrew poets of the Middle Ages—Moses Ben Ezra (born in Granada c. 1060, died 1140) and Judah Ha-Levi (born in Tudela or Toledo 1075), a fugitive at the court of Alfonso VI in 1091 during the Almoravide domination of Andalusia, and a visitor to Córdoba before his departure for Egypt and Jerusalem in 1140. This latter event must have preceded the composition of Judah Ha-Levi's *Muwashshahas* with final verses in the Romance tongue. Then follow Yosef Ben Saddic of Córdoba and Abraham Ben Ezra of Toledo, who, during the first half of the twelfth century, cultivated the literary style which concerns us here. Finally, there is Todros Abulafia whom we find at the court of Alfonso the Wise; he died in 1135. In short, of these authors who paraphrase poetically the Andalusian songs in the Romance language, nearly all belong to the period of the flowering of medieval Hebrew poetry in the hands of the Spanish Jews who, imitating Arabic poetry, raised their own Hebrew poetry to its greatest height. They were most successful in imitating the *Muwashshahas;* and those which interest us here—the ones patterned after the Romance songs—were nearly all written within the half century 1090 to 1140. Only one was written some fifty years earlier—that is, before 1042; another was written a century and a half later. The only Arabic *Muwashshaha* with Andalusian verses published so far is by Al-Amá el Tutelí, who died in 1131. It was therefore contemporaneous with the principal Hebrew poems. The

geographical center in which the activity of these authors took place is bounded by the three Andalusian towns of Córdoba, Sevilla, and Granada.

The names of the two most inspired and celebrated Hebrew poets are linked in a *Muwashshaha* written by Judah Ha-Levi to express his condolences over the death of a brother of Moses Ben Ezra. What distinguishes the two poets is that Moses Ben Ezra has left only two *Muwashshahas* with Romance verselets, whereas Judah Ha-Levi has given us eleven. He thus appears to be the poet who had the greater appreciation of the rhythm and melody of the Mozarabic song.

This surprising discovery of the Arabic and Hebrew *Muwashshahas* arrests our attention, first of all, because through them we can visualize the literary fact stated so simply by the *Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris* in referring to the entry of Alfonso VII into Toledo after his victory over the Almoravides in 1139: "The whole citizenry composed of the three peoples, Christians, Saracens, and Jews, sallied forth to receive him with lutes, zithers, and many other instruments, hailing the conqueror *each in his tongue" (unusquisque eorum secundum linguam suam).* Thus, in Toledo, songs were chanted simultaneously in Spanish, Arabic, and Hebrew at the same feasts and about the same themes of joy. And now these recently discovered *Muwashshahas* carry even to us the voices of the three peoples which intermingled in the twelfth century in the recreations of the cities of southern Spain. In these Arabic and Hebrew stanzas with Romance rhymes there comes to us, as if by magic, a vivid echo of these songs of nearly eight centuries ago. The antitraditional school, which forgot the testimony of the *Chronica Imperatoris* and entrenched itself in the assertion that no poetical text prior to the thirteenth century existed, is now confronted with several examples of those chants which have as a theme the reception of a personality into the city, which the *Chronicle* mentions. One of the songs, recently discovered, was written by Judah Ha-Levi (who also wrote Spanish poetry), and was inserted in a *Muwashshaha* written for the arrival of a Jewish dignitary in Guadalajara between the years 1091 and 1095. This example is half a century older than the songs celebrating Alfonso VII in Toledo, and half a century older than the *Poema del Cid.*

MOTHER AND SISTER AS CONFIDANTES OF LOVE

Of greater interest to us than the songs of reception are those on the subject of love. The greater part of the Mozarabic songs are put in the mouth of a young girl; and in several of them the girl communicates

her amorous wishes to her mother, to whom she calls, *"Ay madre! Qué haré, madre?"* This is not an insignificant detail but a fact of great importance since the mother is also the confidante of the girl in love in a great number of Galician-Portuguese love songs. The key phrase, *Ai madre, moiro d'amor* (Oh, Mother, I am dying of love), which occurs in a song of King Denis of Portugal, may also have been the key phrase for a great many others. We find the same form of appeal so repeatedly in the Castilian songs called *villancicos* that Lope de Vega humorously generalizes: "Without girl and mother, no song." And the same is true even for modern songs: there is no ditty in Spain without girl and mother. This is most characteristic; in other countries girl and mother are not the usual ingredients of lyrical songs. True, songs in which a girl speaks of her lover are common in the literature of all nations *(chansons de femme, Frauenlieder,* and so on). But the majority of these are songs of a woman unhappily married, and their common feature is disrespect for the jealous husband and praise of the lover. The intervention of the mother, on the other hand, as constant confidante and loving protectress of virginal love, is a Spanish peculiarity which appears with surprising constancy through the centuries.

Nor is it the only one. There is another type of song in which the girl, at the sight of her lover who is about to desert and abandon her, cannot restrain her tears: "Tell me, dear sisters, how can I bear my grief? I cannot live without my beloved one. Come quickly to help me find him again!" This anguished lament, so beautifully simple, is particularly noteworthy because it is addressed to the sisters of the loving girl. The same feature characterizes various other love songs, where the girl in love addresses her sister or sisters, *"Ay irmanas!"*—like the *Ay yermaniellas!* in the Mozarabic song. This intervention of the sisters in the lyrical expression of trust is even more significant than the intervention of the mother since it is quite foreign to other literatures and connects the Mozarabic ballad closely with the ancient Galician-Portuguese songs.

Therefore, this point must be stressed: in the Mozarabic love songs mother and sisters appear repeatedly as confidantes; what firmly links the oldest songs with the later Galician-Portuguese, and the even more recent Castilian songs, is the way in which they all surround the fresh poetry of virginal love with the atmosphere of the family, at once intimate and restrained. And this aspect is of capital importance since it corresponds to one of the most salient features of Spanish literature—its moral austerity, especially concerning sexual relations. This is shown in the novel, for example, if we compare two collections

of the fourteenth century: the *Conde Lucanor,* with its continuous preoccupation with moral problems, and the disrespect for moral concerns exhibited in the *Decameron.* We find the same aspect above all in the *Amadís,* the glorification of the first love, unshakable in its faithfulness, as opposed to *Tristan* or *Lancelot,* in which adulterous love is exalted. Our present example is the most popular and the most persistent: the Spanish songs of ten centuries—lyrical expressions of virginal love—contrasted with the French rondels, virelays, and ballads which make fun of the jealous husband.

THE UNITY OF THE SPANISH TRADITION

By these characteristic affinities, not only in detail but in essentials, the Mozarabic songs (evidence of which goes back to the eleventh century), the late love songs, and the Castilian *villancicos* and ditties that exist today, are revealed as the three branches of a powerful tree a thousand years old. This is indeed a solid foundation and support for the traditionalist theory.

And if we return once more to the songs addressed to the sisters, they not only attract us by the peculiar form of appeal and by their extreme simplicity and intense lyricism, but they also surprise us by their metric form—a quatrain in which only the two paired verses rhyme; and even these use an imperfect and assonant kind of rhyme, namely, the equality of vowel but not of consonant sounds:

Garid vos, ay yermaniellas,
com' contener a mieu mali
sin el habib non vivreyu
advolarei demandari.

The octosyllabic quatrain with only two imperfect rhymes was once believed to be a late form entirely, appearing in Spain as well as in Portugal only in the sixteenth century. This view was maintained by the two great specialists of popular chant, F. Rodriguez Marín and Carolina Michaëlis. But now we encounter, as early as the beginning of the twelfth century, an authentic octosyllabic quatrain with imperfect rhyme identical in all respects with those that are sung today all over Spain, serving as the outlet for the irrepressible lyrical impulse of the people from Andalusia to Asturias, and from Catalonia and Aragón to Portugal and Galicia. Today we know for certain that the octosyllabic verse has existed, ignored by all scholars, in a "latent state" since time immemorial, until at the beginning of the twelfth century an eminent Hebrew poet, Judah Ha-Levi, rescued one specimen from eternal oblivion; another specimen, equally ignored by the same specialists, was salvaged in the fifteenth century by a diligent

musicologist. Thus in regard to metric form, too, we have found proof of a tradition many centuries old; and we may note, if only in passing, the eloquent demonstration of the fact that in the life of any tradition there exists a latent state—that is, the hidden existence of a phenomenon, not attested by any contemporary document, which is unnoticed simply because no one has paid any attention to it. This latent state is never understood by the antitraditionalist school, which obstinately insists on exclusive reliance on tangible facts.

ETERNAL ANDALUSIA

More and more confirmed in the traditionalist view, we can now turn to more distant times. We know that the songs of Bética—those of Cádiz, the chief representative of that region—overcame the refined taste of imperial Rome of the first century. The poet Martial informs us that gay Cádiz, *iocosa Gades,* continuously sent her dancers to Rome, and that the songs from Cádiz, *cantica Gaditana,* embellished by the play of the Betican castanets, enjoyed much popularity in Rome; fashionable youth hummed them everywhere. Martial adds that the girls from Cádiz, *puellae gaditanae,* were much imitated in their lascivious dances, corrupting the chaste Roman *Hippolyti.* Pliny the Younger also tells us of the attraction which these singers from Cádiz exerted in the meetings of the grave magistrates. Statius reports how the sound of the Cádiz castanets rose over the din at the Roman Saturnalia; and Juvenal stresses the songs and the inciting dances of the Cádiz youth.

Whoever has some notion of the extraordinary longevity of the traditional traits of a people will associate these ancient notices with the fact that even today the songs and dances of Andalusian women enjoy great prestige. Nevertheless, it is true that too many centuries stand between the Roman civilization and ours. The enormous distance separating them notwithstanding, we perceive yet another point of contact in an entirely different culture, that of Islam. Comments by Roman authors agree perfectly with those of the Arab writers who, after so many upheavals of nations and civilizations, inform us of another period favorable to the wide diffusion of the songs from Bética. The Andalusian Ibn Bassam tells us that the Mozarabic songs from Córdoba between the ninth and tenth centuries inspired the poetical invention of Mucaddam de Cabra, soon followed by a multitude of other poets. In the first half of the eleventh century, the great Cordoban poet and philosopher, Ibn Hazm, reports that the Andalusian *Muwashshahas* were much imitated and chanted by the

Moslems of the East. In the twelfth century, the Cordoban Ibn Cuzman boasts that his *Zajals* were sung in Iraq. At the end of the twelfth century, the Egyptian Ibn Sana Al-Mulk prepared the first anthology of these songs—called *canciones granadinas* in later collections. Above all, it is the recently discovered Arab poets and their Hebrew imitators from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries—nearly all born in Andalusia—who not only give us simple informative notices about the great diffusion of the new *cantica Gaditana* but preserve and repeat for us the same verses of the Mozarabic songs that serve as a model for the species invented by the Cordoban poets of Cabra. The song of *iocosa Bética* experiences its epoch of great expansion under the Arab Empire, as it had previously experienced it under the Roman Empire; but we now find that when, after several centuries of Christianity, the song of the Andalusian girls is received, even within an anti-Christian culture, it becomes subject to a tendency quite different from that of old. In contrast with the songs for obscene dances that were preferred in Rome, these songs are now distinguished by virginal love, the chaste wishes of the first love, confided to the loving sympathy of mother and sister.

To sum up: the *cantica Gaditana* in the Roman Empire and the *canciones granadinas* in the Islamic world reveal the extraordinary power of diffusion of the inexhaustible creative genius of Andalusia, the power which even today is spreading the rich variety of Andalusian tunes within the entire ambit of the Peninsula and even throughout Spanish America.

SPANISH LITERATURE AND THE ORIGINS OF POETRY

At the beginning of this paper I assailed the notion that Spanish literature began with the *Cid,* and in support of this view I adduced Christian and Moslem testimony. Now the discovery of the *Muwashshahas* with Romance endings has added numerous proofs to this old argument. Unnecessary so far as the question of origins is concerned, they are magnificent and convincing as precise illustrations to help establish more solidly the traditionalist theory and to demolish the rash affirmations of the school of tangible facts.

By way of analogy with the well-established case of Spain, we can affirm that a country with an artistic sentiment as lively as Italy's could not possibly have lacked poetry of any kind until the thirteenth century, as is usually maintained, and that a culture as precocious and inventive as that of France could not have had to wait until the eleventh or twelfth century to establish the vernacular pattern of its epic

and lyric poetry. With regard to the great antiquity of its literature, Spain cannot have been an exception. The one sense in which Spain does indeed appear exceptional among the Romance peoples is that it alone possesses any precise information about its primitive popular chants, and that it has preserved abundant examples of these. And this is of indisputable value for literary history in general.

I have often expressed the opinion that the texts of Spanish literature, despite their scarcity, must by virtue of their archaic character and the tenacious traditionalism that animates them, be accepted as the guide to the various questions which the origin of the medieval epic raises. This opinion has been shared by many (G. T. Northup, G. Cirot, Th. Frings, and others). Now we see, also, that concerning our knowledge of the origins of lyric poetry the Spanish contribution is of unique significance. Concerning the epic, Spain preserves mementos and texts of great importance, though they are somewhat later and much scarcer than those of France; but as to primitive lyric poetry, the Spanish texts, though later than the epic ones, now turn out to be of a greater age than those of France or any other of the sister countries. How can we explain this fact, which at first sight does not seem to agree with the greater scarcity of texts of ancient Spanish literature compared to those of France?

During the High Middle Ages all the Romance peoples undoubtedly possessed popular lyrical songs, which have not survived. The song is a necessary means of recreation on festive occasions, as well as during the labors of life. These songs no doubt originated throughout the entire Romanic world at the time the Romance languages were born, each differentiating itself from written Latin. And it was the amateur singers as well as the jugglers—the professional public entertainers—who first sought to give some artistic form to the ordinary language of uncultured conversation. Only much later the clerics, on whom the ministry imposed the duty of talking to the faithful in the common language, must have felt the desire of occasionally associating the people with the ecclesiastical offices by means of songs in the vernacular, added to the liturgical chants.

Today, however, there prevails a tendency to explain the origin of the Romance literatures as deriving solely from ancient Latin literature and from the literature of the medieval clerics. The oral and popular literature is not even considered since it is regarded as purely hypothetical—probable, but lacking tangible proof. Much work is being done along these lines with a great deal of erudition but with regrettable one-sidedness. To confine oneself to this tendency

amounts to the same thing as insisting on explaining the origin of Romance languages as deriving solely from written Latin, classical or medieval. This explanation discards the existence of vulgar Latin—which is labeled as purely hypothetical, since no one dared to write down this popular Latin and since no one would have known how to write it even if he had wanted to because it contains unheard-of sounds that are foreign to the usual alphabet of cultured Latin. Only the neo-Latin tongues were successful, after many centuries and numerous experiments, in writing down these sounds with the letters of the traditional alphabet. Nevertheless, this popular Latin, deduced by philology on the basis of linguistic evidence, is a logical reality as tangible as if we found it written before our eyes. Inasmuch as this view is generally accepted, we repeat that side by side with the Latin poetry written by clerics during the High Middle Ages there existed a lyric poetry in the vernacular, chanted by the illiterate—poetry that no one thought of writing down; the pen had not been able to tame this language not only because its sounds were alien to the Latin alphabet but also because its themes were unknown even to secular Latin usage. But we have now discovered this primitive popular poetry in a number of songs that *were* written down.

But if this primitive poetry was written down and became literature, it is to be noted that this occurred in Andalusia only; it was achieved through the use of an alphabet other than Latin, unencumbered by the conventions and exactitudes demanded within the Western culture. And it occurred in the service of a literature which in no way depended on the usage of many centuries, rooted in the Latin world. Islamic culture, with its voracious power of assimilation —and anxious to appropriate the creations of the most foreign civilizations—could delight in the rough, captivating beauty of the Mozarabic chants by embodying them as the life-giving quintessence of a new Arabic poetry. Thus it was a strange coincidence which has now enabled Spain to document in the field of lyric poetry, as she did earlier in that of the epic, her always exceptional treasure of traditionalism which, in the entire family of sister nations, she alone possesses.

It is clear—we are certain—that just as the Romance languages deriving from a Latin spoken by the people did not take shape without the constant influence of the written and cultured Latin, so we may assume that the songs of the people, and of the jugglers that belong to the people, did not remain completely spontaneous but underwent frequent ecclesiastical influences.

VALUE OF THE MOZARABIC SONGS

The philological value of the recently discovered Mozarabic songs is incalculable. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries there was considerable poetry in the northeast of Spain, much less in the center of the Peninsula. But although the Galician-Portuguese *cancioneros* contain much that is precious, and although their courtly art is inspired by the chants of the people, they contain little that can be assumed to have been taken over faithfully from the anonymous popular art that concerns us here. As for Castile, very little has come to light. But now, all at once, twenty very ancient Andalusian songs—nearly all of authentic traditional character—have broken into the field of historical investigation. Not even the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, just mentioned, have given us as many texts as we now possess from the eleventh and twelfth centuries. And these recently discovered songs—the reflections of two centuries, heretofore so obscure—are perfectly linked with the other rings in the chain of tradition preserved across the resplendent centuries of the late Middle Ages.

Thus the "latent state" of primitive Spanish poetry has suddenly been reduced by two centuries. And these two hundred years, rescued in order to be united with the period which has already been documented, confer upon the whole an extraordinary coherence and clarity. For the Mozarabic songs, despite their great archaism and their strong impregnation with Arabic influences, offer astonishing similarities to later songs: in spirit, in the ethics of their subject matter, as well as in meter, and even in the forms of expression—similarities to the Galician-Portuguese songs on the one hand and to the Castilian *villancicos* on the other. The three branches, which previously could be brought together only tentatively—a conjecture inveighed against by the individualist school—now, on the strength of solid evidence, turn out to be endowed with the unity and continuity of tradition.

Considered alone, the twenty Mozarabic songs—even if compared with the oldest traditional art known—form a treasure precious for its antiquity, for its abundance, and above all for the greater variety of its themes. In these songs we hear of the girl's proud vanity about her white neck which makes her reject the jewels that would conceal it from the longing glances of her lover; of her inner excitement when she hears her lover's call at the door; of her virginal resistance to his caresses, of the weakening protests of yielding love; of the entreaties to her lover not to leave. The loving girl feels her heart rent by her

lover's absence; she feels the deep pain of loneliness, the torments of the heart when Easter approaches without bringing him back; she consults the soothsayer: when will he come?; she feels bitter when she realizes that her sweetheart loves another girl. Such is the simple love song of the Mozarabic girl, forever repeated and perpetually new in the outpourings of the heart. The greatest of the Hebrew poets of the Middle Ages, Judah Ha-Levi—who wrote eleven of the twenty songs, though no other author may claim more than two—seems to be particularly enamored with the lyricism of these ancient Andalusian songs. This is the most eloquent literary success that they can boast.

And these old songs, which after nine hundred years of silence now return to echo in our ears, achieve yet another success: they surprise us despite their strange grammatical morphology, despite the great archaism and strong Arabization of their vocabulary; they refresh us with a real simplicity, an inexpressible charm, a freshness equal to that of the *villancicos* and *letrillas* that had the power to enliven the great poetry of a Gil Vicente and a Lope de Vega. The same elementary motives of sensibility; the same intense lyricism that grows not out of literary manipulation but only spontaneously—a flower that opens under the warmth of living emotion; the same pure candor, the same genuineness which we admire in the later works—perceiving in them a delicious pristine fragrance—we now admire in these much older works. Eternal continuity and eternal renovation, like that of early spring—such is the traditional style, brought forth not by the individual effort of a professional writer but by repeated anonymous alterations, the only style that achieves that beauty which is more than merely literature. Abhorring any artifice, it resembles the loving Mozarabic girl who refuses to wear any ornament on the living beauty of her white neck.

IRELAND'S REPERTORY THEATER

David Grene

THE HEART OF the theatrical life of a city is in its repertory theater, because it is the repertory theater which creates an audience, and it is on the audience that the continued existence of the theater and those who write for it depend. It is possible for the theater to survive where there are only long runs of single plays and casts especially assembled for those plays. We see this as the general rule today, unfortunately, in both London and New York. But very few critics are likely to claim that the theater in either city is healthy. The defects of the single-play, long-run system are indeed quite monstrous. Not even the greatest actor can maintain the quality of his performance when he plays the same role every night for three months, much less when, as is often true, the period of the run is as long as a year or two. Inevitably, the decline in quality is in the direction of a surface and mechanical precision, and the performance of a play after a six months' run bears the same relation to that play in its first three weeks that a waxwork does to a living creature.

The art of acting is largely a training of voice and person in actions which can be formulated as precisely as choreography. The vitality comes from another source, from the imaginative understanding of his part by the actor. And the actor can give this vitality only when the imaginative understanding is still awake, is indeed often still growing. It is only by seeing many such performances of many plays that an audience gradually comes into being, an audience, that is, with sensitivity and standards of taste. As they see the same actor, week after week, performing different roles, they begin, instinctively, to see where his limitations lie, where the frontiers of his personality are fixed so that he cannot effect a simple human transmutation and trade personalities with his part. It is then that the audience begins to understand enough of the secrets of acting to respect the art. For they can see, in a sense, the composition of the role: how it is made up of mechanical movements and yet emerges, in the hands of a great actor, as something totally different from,

and greater than, the aggregate of those movements. This is the theatrical education of an audience. As they grow more sophisticated, the acting grows better, too, for there is nothing which encourages an actor so much as the knowledge that he is appreciated. It is because there is in most Continental cities a traditional association of actors and audience in the great theaters, an association that has lasted two or three centuries, that the performances are incomparably superior to those of London and New York.

In Ireland there is, and has been for more than half a century, a repertory company of a unique character. The Abbey is not only a theater where the same players perform a repertory of different plays throughout the year—it is a national theater. This means that the repertory is more or less restricted to plays by Irishmen or plays about Ireland, and the Abbey has from the first considered it part of its function to put on new plays by Irish authors—at least two or three a year. It is not necessary for me to enter into the early history of the Abbey Theatre—to discuss, for example, the refusal of Yeats and Lady Gregory (forcefully supported by Synge a little later) to follow Martyn and George Moore in their plan to make of the Abbey another artistic repertory theater of the kind that has become so common on the Continent and in England and America. Anyone interested in these early fateful decisions can learn all about them in the journal of Lady Gregory and in the personal writings of Yeats.

The decision of the three great directors of the Abbey—Yeats, Lady Gregory, and Synge—to commit it to an Irish national policy has, through the years, unquestionably narrowed the Theatre's range. But until lately it was true to say that the restriction in choice of plays carried with it compensatory depth and richness in acting and production. If the Abbey put on plays exclusively concerned with peasant life or small-town life in Ireland or even slum life in Dublin, and if there was an emphasis on a certain vein of peasant comedy, and if even the early poetic dramas found few successors, yet the style of acting of the old Abbey Company between, say, 1922 and 1939 was not a simple naturalism. The actors themselves were too great for that; and the life of Ireland in both country and town had (and still largely has) a quality of poetry which prevented even surface imitations of it from becoming bare and shallow in the fashion of the prose dramas of Ernst Toller, or tawdry and affected in sentiment and expression like those of Clifford Odets. The Abbey play and the Abbey Company, and even the little theater itself with its hard seats, cheap prices, and sympathetic community of everyone connected with it—doormen, ticket-office girls, cloakroom attendants,

actors, directors, and audience—became a formalized, almost ritualized whole with tremendous dramatic character.

In the period I have mentioned the Abbey was old enough to have a large repertory of great plays by Synge, Yeats, George Sheils, St. John Ervine, Lady Gregory, and T. C. Murray. It was still young enough to receive its last great accession in Sean O'Casey, and less known but distinguished work by P. Vincent Carroll, Denis Johnson, and Rutherford Mayne. It was a company of actors brilliant enough to reach out, in a few experiments, far beyond the usual Abbey sphere. They played Shaw and Shakespeare, Sophocles and Obey. These performances, though respectable, indicated how far the formalization had gone, for even the leading members of the troupe —the late F. J. McCormick (one of the greatest actors in Europe in his time), Barry Fitzgerald, his brother Arthur Sheils, and Michael Dolan—moved with excessive preciosity in their wider roles. The minute localized detail of their Irish parts clung to their new performances and, in a measure, marred them. But all in all, the playing of the Company at this time was of a virtuosity, range, and brilliance difficult to match outside the great Continental theaters. Not in spite of, but by virtue of its narrow fidelity to the subjects and atmosphere of the Irish countryside and small town, it gave its theme a breadth of treatment and a kind of penetration which made it truly European. This was what Synge had always believed in, and always wanted. The country people of Ireland, deeply understood and expressed in their own rich language, would, he thought, be the revelation of the richness of human beings, in laughter or sorrow but particularly in both, the world over.

This company and the theater which it represented came to an end during the war. F. J. McCormick died, Barry Fitzgerald had already gone to Hollywood, his brother followed him, and various other members of the company were widely dispersed. The unit disappeared. The new company hardly existed as a company: it was a haphazard collection of actors with little direction and less cohesion. The level of performance sank low, and the old *esprit de corps* of the Abbey vanished. At last, just two years ago, the directors decided to appoint as producer Ria Mooney, a very skillful actress of the old company, with large experience in both acting and production in Ireland and America. This last summer and winter I saw the fruit of her work. It is a very remarkable achievement. A young company is being trained in the best traditions of the old Theatre. I saw the actors in new plays and in some of the old—in Synge's *Shadow of the Glen* and O'Casey's *Juno and the Paycock,* as well as in *Mountain*

Flood by Cunningham and Ervine's *Friends and Relations.* The players have great freshness, ability, and enthusiasm. They suffer acutely from the criticism of Dublin playgoers, who not unnaturally but most unfairly contrast each performance and each rendering of each part with that of the old company. Memories are somewhat treacherous. The old company was, it is true, first rate. But people have forgotten that the old company was not static—that it had a period of learning and that in the years just before the war it had grown somewhat tired and mechanical. The audience is not grateful for the genuine originality of some of the new players. Instead, there is resentment against them for not reproducing a facsimile of the old masters. But I think the cure for this is time. The new company is so good and the production so skillful that it is likely the members will gradually win a place in the affections of their audience.

The Abbey is faced with other difficulties of a more serious kind, however. In the first place, it is poor. Badly paid as the players still are—they were much worse off in the old days when it was devotion only that kept an actor like F. J. McCormick with the Abbey—the salaries are a large share of a budget which is slim enough. The theater is small, and with the tradition of cheap seats (the dearest costs 6/9 or just under a dollar) the house must be packed every night in order even to meet costs. This has led to the hurried withdrawal of some new plays, perhaps plays of merit, within a week or less. This is without parallel in the past history of the Theatre which, under the direction of Yeats and Lady Gregory, always had something of the "public-be-damned" air about it—which was healthy. The chinks in the financial structure are plugged with a government grant, which is not extensive. The Abbey Theatre was the first independent theater in Europe to accept a government subvention. I do not think it can be honestly claimed that any of the three Irish governments since then has misused its power. But certainly within this period the controversy about Gaelic plays has grown, and the party in favor of plays in Irish has won more often than not. From the time the Theatre was founded there have been some Gaelic plays (the late Douglas Hyde produced Gaelic translations for the Theatre in its very early years) but they have been very few indeed. In 1947 six Gaelic plays appeared on the Abbey boards; furthermore, in terms of the time allotted to them the disproportion was even more manifest. Last Christmas there was a Gaelic pantomime which ran for seven weeks—mostly because it played to full houses (the Gaelic was, I understand, very simple), and the cause of the Gaelicists and the commercial interests of the Theatre were one. This tendency

is bad. The plays are usually Gaelic translations of English and Continental originals. The effort to make Ireland a genuinely bilingual country has failed. According to the latest published figures, the proportion of persons speaking the native tongue has declined despite strenuous state assistance. In the Gaelic plays, the Abbey does not get fare comparable with the English productions at their best.

However, the competition within the theater between plays in English and those in Gaelic is not the most serious menace to the Abbey. More important are the want of good new plays in English and a certain weakness in the quality of direction of the Theatre. Most of the new plays submitted to the Abbey in the last few years suffer from the knowledge which the authors had of the Abbey repertory. A special diction has become current—it is not correct to call it a dialect, for it is native to no part of Ireland—a kind of composite diction made up of all the striking phrases the prospective Abbey dramatist has ever heard and treasured and then shaped consciously and unconsciously to the lips of men and women, dead or gone from the Abbey—the old Abbey Company. When I attended the first performance of *Mountain Flood* last summer I could say with truth: this was written for McCormick and that for Fitzgerald and that for May Craig and that for Michael Dolan. The tail wags the dog. Except for Michael Molloy, the young dramatists of the last ten years have nothing to say, it would seem, and what little is there is in gyves and fetters to the extreme sophisticated formalization of an excellent repertory company and its excellent repertory. Of course, such breaks in the line of creative dramatists have happened before—for instance, between Synge's death in 1907 and the first productions of O'Casey in the early twenties. And it might be said with some truth that the Abbey has had no *very* distinguished dramatist writing for it since O'Casey stopped writing his Dublin plays and went to England in 1930. But in both periods there was work being done which, if not of the very first order, was near it. Between 1907 and 1922 there were some of the best plays of T. C. Murray, St. John Ervine, and many of Yeats' verse plays. In the thirties there were Denis Johnson with his *Moon in the Yellow River,* P. Vincent Carroll's *Shadow and Substance,* and some very beautiful short pieces by Frank O'Connor, such as *In the Train.* It is a sad fact, but one that cannot be ignored, that since 1940 there have been no new plays at the Abbey that can be regarded as anywhere near first rank, with the possible exception of *The King of Friday's Men* by Molloy. This last has serious defects: the melodrama is lurid, the characters are

less than sketchy, and at times the writing is childishly exaggerated. But there is drive and passion in it, some real dramatic poetry, and a gift for pathos and beauty. Mr. Molloy is young. He has written two or three other plays which I have not had the good fortune to see or read. But he may well be what the Abbey is waiting for.

The faults in direction are difficult to cure and, in a way it is ungracious to comment on them. The present directors of the Abbey have made an honest effort to face a difficult situation and bring the Theatre back to its former condition. But in the past the Abbey has been led, and led brilliantly, by three great dramatic writers—Yeats, Lady Gregory, and Synge. By virtue of the state grant, a government nominee has always occupied one seat on the board, but the initiative for years lay, of course, with Yeats and Lady Gregory, and much of the execution and furtherance of their plans depended on Lennox Robinson. Yeats and Lady Gregory are dead, and inevitably the men who were associated with them find it difficult to take the places of these giants. Now that a new company has been virtually created, with actors of ability to carry the productions, the need for new ideas and new drive on the part of the directors makes itself felt.

All in all, I feel hopeful about the Abbey, if for no other reason than that from the day it was founded its continued existence has always been in jeopardy; so far it has not only always continued, but, with intervals of dormancy, continued brilliantly. It was a very great achievement in the last two years to have trained a new company which bids fair to rival the old; for this, great credit must be given to Ria Mooney. Perhaps the new dramatists will come eventually. In the meantime the repertory of the old great plays will be well rendered.

WATERCOLOR BY PAUL NASH

"Folly Landscape,
Creech, Dorset"

Brewster Ghiselin

Piercing a length of wall a child could circle
In three breaths running, three great doorways gaze
Through stonework paled by blisters of high cloud.
Cornices, crenellation, pyramids
Imposed on the unpaved hills are solitude
And absence, voices in an enormous hall.
Part of a hoop of shadow hangs overhead:
The arch is shelter from no cloud or blue;
Light looks from behind and floods from before. No sign
Saddens the shaggy upland except this
Threshold leading from the wind into the wind.

ANDRÉ GIDE

Albert Béguin

André Gide is dead, enveloped in a fame of which he had long refused the external tokens. He was a member of no academy, had never—prior to winning the Nobel Prize—received any literary award. It was not that he was indifferent to success or that he neglected to do whatever was necessary to attain it. But early in his life he had chosen a kind of celebrity that develops without visible glamor—a somewhat subterranean influence that flattered his taste for the clandestine. He arranged for limited editions of his first works, studied every reaction to them, and attended carefully to an immense correspondence; in these ways he sought the approbation of his fellow writers and of the young generation. Until 1914 he seemed to be fascinated by the prestige of Maurice Barrès, one of the last revered "masters" of French letters. But later he posed readily as anti–Barrès, engaged in subtle polemics against him, and systematically opposed his ideas. By the time he was forty his influence was already considerable. *Nourritures terrestres* had become the gospel of many young people—the textbook of liberation to which they turned for guidance in their insurrection against family morality.

In 1909, with some of his friends, Gide left the old publishing house of the *Mercure de France,* where he had mingled with the disciples of Mallarmé and the last generation of symbolists, to found the *Nouvelle Revue Française.* This became his battlehorse and the instrument through which he exerted a powerful impact upon his age. Two years later, the opening of the Vieux–Colombier theater by his friend Jacques Copeau revealed that his aesthetic teachings were reaching into the theater. After 1918, and for many years to come, it was Gide who was most entitled to be called the "foremost

contemporary." Backed by the influential publishing house of Gallimard, he imposed his preferences upon others, made and unmade reputations, and ruled in the world of letters almost without opposition. None of his works has ever attained the huge circulation figures of the fashionable novelists, but it may be said without exaggeration that the entire intellectual elite of France, and of Europe, has for thirty years considered him one of the greatest writers of the century. However his attitudes—political, religious, moral—may have varied, their fluctuations were followed as if each of them constituted an event of the first importance. With the publication of his memoirs, *Si le grain ne meurt,* his apology for homosexuality, *Corydon,* and finally his *Journal,* Gide succeeded in focusing general attention on his personal "case," which his admirers and his opponents debated passionately.

Today we may ask ourselves whether there has not been a strong element of illusion in this exceptional renown. The years that immediately follow a writer's death put his work to a hard test. It may happen that it will be rapidly enveloped in silence, as in the case of Anatole France. Moreover, the disappearance of an author reveals in some fashion his true face and his real greatness, as was the case with Marcel Proust, or, more recently, Georges Bernanos. As far as Gide is concerned, I would readily wager that there will be disillusion and descent, if not into oblivion, at least to a rank much lower than that accorded him while he was alive. It is a long time since the first form of his fame began to wane—the fame that rather secretly surrounded the author of *Nourritures terrestres* as the instigator of a revolution which proclaimed freedom in the sphere of morals as much as in that of aesthetics. I doubt that Gide will be survived by that legend which, not without his prudent co-operation, not long ago made him seem to be a sage, and the Goethe of our time. His true place is more modest.

Literary history will probably place André Gide among the witnesses of a crisis in civilization rather than among the truly creative minds. It will hardly leave intact the prestige of nonconformism—so long considered by both Gide and his disciples to be the most salutary virtue of his mind—that was the enemy of accepted ideas and traditional principles. The professional nonconformist, if he becomes too self-conscious, will eventually live with his eyes fixed on that which he does not want to be. Little by little, as a result of stressing his "being different," such a nonconformist begins to exist as a function of what he opposes; and like certain heretics haunted

by the orthodoxy they have renounced, he takes root again in the very soil from which he sought to be delivered. He who is genuinely different is not so concerned with appearing and proclaiming himself to be so. The uniqueness that Gide cultivated almost desperately did not prevent him from becoming year by year more assimilated to that "family" which he had cursed so vehemently that he was forever compelled to confront it.

His last writings reveal an unexpectedly strong attachment to a certain form of bourgeois civilization: that which produced the type of intellectual of which he himself was one of the most successful examples. He was typical of those men of leisure for whom the day always includes some reading, some reverie, and some detached conversation. To these men humanity seems to be composed only of their peers, free to venture forth occasionally in the direction of the social community (a trip to the Congo, a transitory attachment to communism); but such sudden excursions into the historical world are soon followed by a return to solitary life—voluntary, but difficult to endure. Then if there is a change in the conditions that permit the practice of this extreme individualism, of this aristocratic, antibourgeois attitude, the isolated individual imagines he is witnessing the end of *all* civilization. Like André Gide, Paul Valéry had this feeling of approaching disaster at a time when the form of freedom favorable to the reflections of the "detached" intellectual disappeared. Both lacked a sense of the march of time, a sense of history and of that hope which history carries through the ages.

For his young readers of 1910 and 1920, Gide occupied the place of Nietzsche—then unknown, or discovered only through Gide's interpretation. This was a great misfortune, for simple individualism, revolting against the already weakened moral tyranny of bourgeois society, thus appeared in the guise of authentic revolt. Much time was lost in fighting what was becoming obsolete anyway, when one could have learned from Nietzsche how to face more formidable adversaries, above all those which one carries within himself. Nietzsche and Rimbaud did not lose time in challenging the external enemy; after such skirmishes—which are easily won—they passed on to attack the idols within: their own reason for existence, the state of mankind, God.

Gide cannot stand comparison either with those he has set up as his own masters or with those men of his generation—Claudel, Péguy, Proust—whose very existence embarrassed him and made him unfair (only with regard to Valéry was he always restrained by a sort of reverent awe). He suggested a hundred times that he was a

spiritual descendant of Goethe, but the comparison is devastating. Without doubt he did share with Goethe a vast curiosity and a concern for studied gestures, but not the gift of poetry. In his old age there were points of analogy with that of Goethe: they appeared equally preoccupied with exemplary attitudes. But Goethe, in order to become the sage of Weimar, had first to restrain within himself the restless genius of an explosive and vigorous youth. Again, Gide took pleasure in cultivating what he thought to be affinities with Montaigne. But one has only to reread what he has written on the subject to realize the considerable difference in intellectual scope that separates the two writers. One does not find in Gide either the impatient thirst for knowledge or that marvelous mental structure that makes the analyses of the *Essais* so vivid and so poetic.

What did Gide lack, that prevented him from leaving us more than the project of a work never realized (though he always discussed it with a singularly lucid awareness of the inner conditions necessary for the birth of such a work)? He lacked the ability to view himself without self-infatuation, to impose silence on an interest in himself so vivid that he assumed in others the same desire to know not merely the human being in Gide but his peculiarities, down to mere accidentals. The *Journal* exposes dangerously the weakness of Gide's other books: they could never be detached from their author. All his writings remain rather closely tied to that in him which had the originality of a "case." Imprisoned within the limits of his personal anomaly, he had the misfortune of reducing every revolt to the homosexual's protest against the society that oppressed him. This Gidean immoralism, which is hardly more than the morality of the invert, stands infinitely below the amoral ethics of a Nietzsche.

Gide's critical work is the most valuable part of his writings. His merits as a literary explorer ought not to be exaggerated. His *Dostoievski,* for instance, has for a long time perpetuated in France a singularly narrow picture of the author of *The Brothers Karamazov.* But when prejudice did not distort his judgment, Gide could speak of the work of others, classical and contemporary, with the insight that is usually the prerogative of the creators themselves. We may conclude from this that Gide had the gifts of creative genius, and that it was but an accident that condemned him vainly to mimicking the act in which great works originate. *Les caves du Vatican,* which was to be a great novel, turned into a *farce.* Gide's second attempt, *Les faux monnayeurs,* is valuable because of that

strange game of mirrors which inflates the diary of the principal character—the novelist Eduard, who is himself writing *Les faux monnayeurs*—into the diary of the author, Gide. One is reminded of the famous portrait of Valéry in front of his mirror: "je me voyais me voir me voir me voir me voir. . . . " Simulating the spontaneity of the true novelist, Gide was never able to desist for a minute from that critical self-consciousness and self-observation. And it is here that he is most attractive: in that tragic inability to overcome his play-acting and to elude his own vigilance. One can understand that the myth of sincerity haunted and tortured him throughout his whole life. One can understand that having nearly succeeded in adapting himself to the inner gestures of prayer, he should have imitated so well in his last years the attitudes and the language of defiance and unbelief. Nothing of what he wanted to teach (with that didactic bent that is so typically Protestant) carried the force that genuine *élan* creates. This does not mean at all that his heart was really without *élan;* on the contrary, he possessed it abundantly, but without its really bearing fruit in expression or in created form.

There remains one profound mystery that will undoubtedly save his work: the very mystery of his perpetual doubling and trebling of self, of his manifold sincerities. Above all, there remains the faithful and touching desire to wrest from the inward unknown a single cry that might have the accent of simple truth.

TEXTBOOKS AND WAR

An Experiment in International Agreement

E. H. Dance

The city of Brunswick in the British Zone of Germany (about twenty-five miles from Helmstedt, the Anglo-Russian check point at the Iron Curtain) is rapidly becoming the center of a significant movement in educational internationalism. This is not a new movement; it is, rather, an intensified revival of a movement initiated in the prewar years. It is led by Doctor Georg Eckert, Professor of History at the Brunswick Kantochschule. Of the numerous conferences between English and German teachers which have been organized all over the British Zone by the Foreign Office, two have been held at Brunswick. At the first of these two conferences, in July, 1949, Professor Eckert learned that the Historical Association in England had been investigating the problem of international misrepresentations in the school history books of various countries. During the war, when members of European governments and universities were congregated in London, the International Committee of the Historical Association had taken the opportunity to meet a number of these persons, and had with their advice and collaboration evolved a scheme for textbook inspection which it submitted to UNESCO when the war was over. At the same time, Professor Eckert and his associates in Brunswick and Land Niedersachsen had been collaborating with the Textbook Section of the Education Branch of the British Control Commission for Germany in supplying history textbooks to replace the hopelessly antidemocratic manuals of the Nazis.

Here, then, were two bodies—the Historical Association and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Lehrerverbände—interested in the problem of producing school history books as free as possible from

incentives to international friction. The problem had been tackled by the League of Nations between the wars, but the League scheme had misfired, and plans of great promise in the 1920's had faded into insignificance by 1939. Consequently, this Brunswick contact between Arbeitsgemeinschaft and the Historical Association was particularly important. By early fall, 1949, the two bodies had agreed to exchange textbooks, and to have them criticized by competent and scholarly teachers.

The last few months of 1949 were a period of experimentation, but by the new year both bodies were ready to go ahead. During the first half of 1950 the German and the English associations exchanged a number of textbooks, and by midsummer each group had produced six or seven detailed criticisms pointing out where there appeared to be falsifications or misrepresentations in the textbook versions of German or British history.

By this time the general outlines of a scheme of co-operation were becoming clear. Naturally, there were difficulties, owing to the different circumstances in England and in Germany. In Germany schoolbooks are still scarce, since Nazi books were destroyed after the war. In England, on the contrary, new books have never ceased to be published in considerable numbers, and it is often difficult to decide which of them shall be sent to Germany for criticism; but enough has been done to get the new scheme working.

Meantime, the indefatigable Doctor Eckert was establishing similar contacts with other countries: Holland, the Scandinavian countries, Austria, Switzerland, France, and the United States. The last two and Denmark are already co-operating with the Germans, and Anglo-French co-operation has begun as well. In France, the active association is the Société des Professeurs d'Histoire et de Géographie; in Denmark, the Foreningen af Gymnasie—og Seminarielaerere i Historie; and in the United States, the National Council for the Social Studies.

The 1950 Brunswick conference was attended by a number of interested observers from other countries, including the executive secretary of the National Council for the Social Studies, Mr. Merrill F. Hartshorn. The chief objective of this second conference was to clear up such practical difficulties as had arisen in the working of the textbook scheme. In particular, the criticisms sent in by the examiners appointed by each side varied so much in length and intensity that it seemed prudent to fix some sort of norm. More important, each nationality needed to know how the other was reacting to its criticisms. How much offense had been given? In what

cases did the other side find the criticism as nonobjective as the books criticized? In short, were the criticisms made in good faith, and were they believed to be reasonably fair?

These were the tasks to which the conference addressed itself. Both teams included university as well as school teachers—six English (including two women) and seven German. The conference lasted eight days. The first two or three days were devoted partly to social activities, to allow the delegates to become acquainted, and partly to lectures on an academic level in both languages, giving English and German viewpoints of various aspects of the crucial period, 1890–1914, in Anglo-German relations. Then the teams settled down to deal in detail with the German and English criticisms of textbooks submitted during the preceding months.

At this point it became clear that the conference might go one step further than had originally been intended. There was plenty to amend in some of the criticisms, but many of them did not reach down to fundamentals—most were merely matters of detail. The reason for this, surprisingly enough, was the absence of any very deep cleavage of opinion between the two sets of teachers concerning the significant events and trends of the period under review. Both Germans and Englishmen proved willing to agree on matters in which disagreement had been anticipated; and each team showed its anxiety to appreciate the attitude of the other. This made it possible for an unforeseen step to be taken. The delegates agreed to try to draw up an account of the causes of Anglo-German hostility from 1890 to 1914 which both sides could accept as reasonable and impartial but which would omit nothing of fundamental significance.

It is important to emphasize, at this point, that this was a meeting, not of academic historians (though academic historians of distinction were among the delegates), but of practicing teachers; and that the version of Anglo-German relations which they produced did not commit either the English or the German association in any way. Its main object was not to *discover* the truth about this quarter-century, but to find a way of presenting it in books for children in a manner acceptable to both nationalities. The basic facts considered were those given in the works of well-known authorities; the presentation alone was new, and it was meant for classroom use by schoolteachers, not for the enlightenment of adults.

If this limitation of aim is realized, it will surely appear highly significant that two groups of teachers, one English and one German, fresh from the antagonisms of a recent war, could get together at one table and produce an agreed version (and the agreement was unani-

mous) of a period of Anglo-German relations during which the two peoples drifted away from a possible alliance into hostility, and then into war. The version which the conference produced no doubt has its defects; it has already been criticized on some points by both English and German scholars. But it is impossible to deny that it is in itself a historical document of some importance, and its authors hope that, with all its imperfections, it may serve as a spur to teachers of other nations to improve upon it.

ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 1890–1914

The following version of the chief disputed points in the history of Anglo-German relations in the period 1890–1914 was accepted unanimously by both sides. It is an attempt at an agreed version short enough to be suitable for a school textbook. It does not claim to be a scholarly presentation.

1. Alliance Proposals
   a. Joseph Chamberlain reacted to unofficial talks by speeches hinting at alliance with Germany.
   b. The Wilhelmstrasse, in spite of its desire for an alliance, remained aloof, hoping that the intensification of Anglo-Russian rivalry would make more favorable terms possible.
   c. England therefore gradually lost interest, and by 1902–3 was leaning towards an agreement with France.

2. Entente Cordiale
   a. Provoked by fear of leaving Germany as an unintended beneficiary.
   b. Not an alliance, only a settlement of all extra-European differences, especially in Egypt and Morocco, with a secret clause promising diplomatic support to France in Morocco.

3. Anglo-Russian Rapprochement

   Highly artificial, encouraged by France, accepted reluctantly by England. It was a consequence of the more tense European situation, and the uneasiness in England due to fluctuating German policy.

4. Naval Policy
   a. There was no public alarm about naval rivalry until about 1906, when Germany challenged England's two-power standard of 1890.
   b. The German desire for a navy was due to:
      1. Her wish to take a part in world politics commensurate with her economic and cultural importance.
      2. Economic and social changes in Germany resulting from the transition from an agricultural to an industrial society.
      3. The possibility of disputes with England.
   c. This was a major factor in British distrust of Germany until 1914.

5. Commercial Rivalry

   Not a fundamental cause of the war.

6. "Einkreisung"

   The agreements of 1904 and 1907 were not due to any intentional encirclement. Germany's fluctuating foreign policy since Bismarck's dismissal alienated Russia and England in the same way, and eventually led Germany to feel isolated.

The conference decided to incorporate in its findings the decision of the Franco-German conference of historians in 1935. They agreed—

1. that the documents do not permit attributing in 1914 to any government or any nation a premeditated will to a European war;
2. that there were belligerent currents in the various states.

It would be sensible for textbooks to limit themselves to stating that mutual mistrust had reached the highest pitch; that in leading circles the belief prevailed that war was inevitable; that everybody attributed aggressive intentions to the others, and that everyone accepted the danger of war.

THE EDINBURGH FESTIVALS AND A SCOTTISH THEATER

George Scott-Moncrieff

As a whole, and as was anticipated by the more far-seeing commentators, Scottish affairs have not gone well since the war. London's rather desperate efforts to concentrate everything possible in the London area, aided by the new powers afforded by the Socialist State, have frustrated several promising trends in Scottish industry and development. Even hard-bitten Conservative politicians—and in Scotland Conservatives are still called Unionists because of their opposition to nineteenth-century demands for Irish and Scottish devolution—have come out with statements of a decidedly "nationalist" character, condemning the stranglehold exerted on their country by centralized state control.

It is against this setting that the Edinburgh Festival has, rather surprisingly, emerged with some assertion of national vitality. While receiving support from government-sponsored bodies, the Festival has been primarily promoted by the people of Edinburgh. Although so many of the best performances have been given by foreigners, Edinburgh has provided the setting and an enthusiastic hospitality. The Festivals have emphatically been a success.

This is gratifying. There have been some outstanding performances, and many intelligent visitors have added to the interest of the Festivals. Yet, from the Scottish point of view, the question remains: What will be the effect upon Scottish life of this impact of international cultures?

The immediate effect is certainly a good one. It is fine to hear the Milan Orchestra and the New York Philharmonic perform in our own capital, to see world-famous theatrical and ballet companies, to have a plethora of art exhibitions in our galleries. Yet we may

naturally feel that while these things contribute much to our enjoyment they are importations, conveniently brought to our door but not necessarily serving to stimulate artistic creation amongst our own people.

For a small country, Scotland has in the past made quite a creditable contribution to the arts. Unfortunately, the oppression to which the lesser neighbors of powerful peoples are liable, and which gave a peculiarly defeatist character to our Reformation, strangled many promising manifestations. Literature, drama, music, painting (except for portraits), were for about two hundred years actively, and fairly effectively, discouraged, and emerged again only in the middle of the eighteenth century before a still largely disapproving public. (In Sir Walter Scott's day the first effort to found a Musical Festival in Edinburgh was bitterly assailed from the pulpits.) This entailed a considerable loss for there had been signs of a vital Scottish contribution to literature in particular. The Scottish "Chaucerians," Dunbar, Henryson, Gavin Douglas, were not only good poets but seemed likely to found a good school of poetry. With *The Three Estates* David Lindsay to some degree anticipated the work of the Elizabethans in England. There was the quality of thought and writing, the beginning of a medium, to provide Scotland with a parallel theater. But by the time Shakespeare was writing it was almost impossible for a play to be performed anywhere in the length or breadth of Scotland.

The Three Estates was performed at the second Festival, in 1948, almost exactly four hundred years after its last performance. It was, to the surprise of the Festival Committee, the outstanding success of the year; and the success was repeated in 1949, and is likely to be again in 1951. It was of course helped by intelligent adaptation (the original is very long) by the Scottish playwright, Robert Kemp, by the beautiful costumes of an excellent stage designer, Mollie MacEwen, and by the brilliant production of Tyrone Guthrie, probably one of the only living producers who can take full advantage of an apron stage. The acting and the play itself, however, both had the quality of a national idiom: they were Scottish just as a performance of *The Playboy of the Western World* in the Abbey Theatre is Irish. This fact was warmly appreciated by the foreign visitors, who felt that at last they were getting the dramatic expression of the architecture, the scenery, and the life that they found in Edinburgh. It evoked an outcry of recognition from Scotspeople themselves.

Motives are customarily mixed, and it would be wrong to overlook a certain element in the native appreciation of *The Three Estates*

that can fairly be dubbed narrowly sectarian. Lindsay's satire, while concerned with all three estates of the old Scottish Parliament, the Barons, the Burghers, and the Church, draws most of its humor whence it is most easily drawn, from the third. It is curious to reflect that the play was first performed at the command of that pious Catholic queen, Mary of Guise, mother of Mary Stuart; that, after the success of the Reforming party, it was not to be performed again for four hundred years, and then should be staged in the Assembly Hall of the Church of Scotland, built actually on the site of the Palace of Mary of Guise under the shadow of Edinburgh Castle. Whatever its faults, the Catholic Church in Scotland just before the Reformation was not afraid to have them pointed out. The Reformed Church had no such tolerance. *The Assembly,* the first play even to be written in Scotland after *The Three Estates,* appeared a hundred and fifty years later. Just as the former was largely an attack upon the Catholic Establishment, so the latter was largely an attack upon the Presbyterian, the work of the Episcopalian wit, Dr. Pitcairn: but it had to be printed in London, and has never yet been performed.

As the eighteenth century advanced, Allan Ramsay, the poet-father of the more distinguished painter of that name, wrote his *Gentle Shepherd,* a pastoral piece singularly undramatic in conception. This, too, was revived at the Edinburgh Festival of 1949. Adaptation, production, and costumes were in the same hands, and by sheer brilliance of pastiche and setting—in the Regency Grecian of the Royal High School—was a charming entertainment though quite lacking the rich quality of David Lindsay's satire. The next play to be written was the celebrated *Douglas, A Tragedy* by John Home. This came in the later part of the century, after a theater had been successfully established in Edinburgh, and was written by a minister who had to resign office as a result. It was at the first performance of *Douglas* that, legend has it, an overenthusiastic member of the audience cried out, "Whaur's your Wullie Shakespeare noo!"

Douglas was revived, with a good production, in the repertory of three plays staged by the Glasgow Citizens' Theatre at the 1950 Festival. It was interesting but rather as a museum piece, a vehicle for rhetoric in an outmoded fustian. Like all the English plays of the time, it is as dead as mutton today. Indeed, *Douglas* was entirely within the contemporary English tradition with no originality or character of its own and little poetry. One can only reflect upon the unique range of Shakespeare, who could be popular in his own time for qualities entirely out of fashion today, when he remains popular for others.

The other two plays in the 1950 repertory were modern, one by Eric Linklater, a novelist who seems out of sympathy with the stage, the other by James Bridie, perhaps the best dramatist Scotland has produced to date.

James Bridie died this year, and his death is a great loss to the Scottish theater. Like Sir James Barrie he had an excellent technique, but he was without Barrie's cloying whimsy. There was, to be sure, a certain indecision about the final acts of his plays. To some degree this was wholesome, a concession to the unpredictable in man's lot: but it reflected also a weakness characteristic of Scottish writing—a misgiving about poetry, directly born of the rather awful moral certitude of generations of Calvinism; a lack of assurance in the veracity of the poetic conclusion essential to anything that aspires to poetry. A lyric poet, like Burns, could outsing his doubt in the brevity of a score of lines. A compendious novelist, like Scott, could avoid the issue by serving both conclusions more or less. But a dramatist's work is too long to be sung, and too short to ramble to several ends. It demands certitude, not a moral certitude but one that, while implicitly accepting the limitations of human comment, carries an inspired assurance of its own validity.

For all our enjoyment of the fine musical and dramatic performances brought to Edinburgh by our distinguished visitors, let us repeat that it is inevitable that we in Scotland should hope to see the Festivals in our capital stimulating our own artistic output. It is difficult not to feel that the focal point lies in the drama. Drama is a cradle of so many arts that it can make contributions and give scope to them all. Scottish music, despite an unusual wealth of folksong and traditional airs, has never developed orchestrally. As architects, Scotsmen have built fine things in their own country, and have not been without their influence beyond it. There have been some good phases of Scottish painting. Our country has had a number of notable writers. Yet one is left with the feeling that all the arts could benefit from the growth of a strong theatrical tradition of a kind that was for too long stifled: when in the eighteenth century it was given scope, it was at a bad period and almost entirely served by visiting plays and companies from London.

Eschewing Barrie's sentimental approach, James Bridie became a major success both at home and with the London theatergoing public for his shrewd studies of Scottish life and character. It was he who was chiefly responsible for the founding of the Glasgow Citizens' Theatre. The Edinburgh Festival Committee has given its support to this theater. It is to be hoped that it will, likewise, give every pos-

sible support to all similar native ventures, even those that may seem small and obscure, so that they may provide a practical stimulus to the Scottish theater while at the same time they enrich their Festival with native fare.

With its demands upon playwright, producer, designers, actors, and audience, and its mutual impacts and inspirations, the theater, one may say, holds the stage as a focus both for the artist and for his public. The Festival in Edinburgh has a good deal of its own drama, with the floodlit Castle, the Highlanders and red-tunicked guardsmen marching and countermarching to the bands on the Esplanade, the teeming crowds and inquiring strangers. Scotsmen do not take to the stage with the almost unnatural ease of the Irish, but they are finding a new interest in the theater, and the Festivals should serve to encourage that with, one hopes, due fruition.

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

He was called everything from "a brilliant journalist" to "the most dangerous undergraduate Yale has seen in years."

William F. Buckley, Jr.

author of

God and Man at Yale

The Superstitions of "Academic Freedom"

Introduction by John Chamberlain

BUCKLEY'S career at Yale (class of '50) was brilliant and stormy. The class historian described him: "The most outspoken *News* chairman in 70 years, William F. Buckley, Jr., neatly undercut tolerance, tomfoolery, and everything to the left of Senator Taft. *News* editorials, for once, were regularly read: 'What'd Buckley say this morning?' He was his Class' Bright Young Man, among many bright young men; for better or for worse—and perhaps significantly — we had none to match him." His first book amounts to a declaration of war against the present drift of American education. Using his own alma mater, Yale, as a case in point, he shows how "academic freedom" is being used to undermine traditional American values. Buckley is an eloquent spokesman for the new generation of conservatives—the "new radicals" on the university scene.

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